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I. INTR.ODUCTION1 
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
This thesis is an action research study concerning an 
ongoing organizational change of the Tri-Services Coordinated 
Care (TRICARE) program. The objectives of this thesis are to 
describe the Coordinated Care/Managed Care Program, explain 
the reasons that led the Department of Defense's medical 
community to implement this enormous organizational change, 
analyze why the military chose the Tidewater area as the site 
for this program, and, most importantly, to report the 
findings made during this field research. 
B. RESBAR.CB 
1. Data Collection. 
Interviews were the primary means used to collect data 
on the Tidewater TRICARE Coordinated Care Program. The 
interview method of collecting data was chosen because it was 
determined to provide the best potential for gathering 
qualitative data. Personal interviews were conducted durinq 
a one week period in August 1993. Telephone interviews were 
1The first three chapters of this thesis were written in 
cooperation with Capt Guillermo Nerio, USMC and Capt Richard 
B. O'Connor, II, USA. Similarities between Chapters I, II and 
III of this thesis and theirs is intentional. 
1 
conducted between September and December 1993. Each telephone 
interview lasted between 30 and 45 minutes, and personal 
interviews lasted between one and two hours. Eight face-to-
face interviews and sixteen telephone interviews were 
conducted (see Figure 1). 
NtJMBBR OP INTERVIEWS BY LOCATION 
TRI CARE TRI CARE NMC LANGLEY McDONALD VA 
LOCATION PROJECT SERVICE PORTSMOUTH/ AFB ARMY 
OFFICE CTR CLINICS HOSP 
NUMBER 8 2 4 4 3 3 
li":!:'.::'.!°'~ J. 
Interviewees were selected from all over the Tidewater area 
including the three military hospitals, the VA hospital, 
subordinate clinics, TRICARE Service Centers, and the TRICARE 
Project Office. 
The interviews were semi-structured which allowed the 
interviewer the freedom to pursue topics they deemed imper-
tant. The interview protocol provided an introductory 
statement followed by general questions about the TRICARE 
program, how it affected the interviewee, and how well the 
program was operating. There was some desree of directiveness 
once the interview began. The interviewer asked probing 
descriptive questions (i.e., asking the interviewee to 
describe in depth what happened in a particular situation) and 
evaluative questions (i.e., asking the interviewee's opinion 
2 
regarding specific situations) . The interview protocol was 
evaluated each evening during the interview week and was 
adjusted based on issue discoveries made by the interviewer. 
After determining what additional data was needed and where to 
obtain it, telephone interviews were used to obtain supple-
mental information. Telephone interviews were more directive 
in nature than the face- to-face interviews and focused on 
individual participation in the TRICARE program. Interviewees 
were asked direct, focused and specific questions. No formal 
or statistical method of sampling was used to select the 
interviewees. Interviews originated with managers at the 
TRICARE Project Office, and o~ce a specific topic was 
formalized, subsequent telephone interviews were con1ucted 
with personnel from the hospitals and clinics. Several follow 
up interviews were also conducted with Project Office 
personnel. Each interview was tape-recorded while the 
interviewer took notes to ensure answers were recorded 
verbatim. Each interview was later transcribed by the 
interviewer and indexed both alphabetically and by location. 
2. Data Analysis. 
Data analysis was a continuous process. Data 
collected from the interviews was analyzed using qualitative 
methods. The first step in the analysis was to read each 
interview to determine the major issues identified by the 
interviewees. As the interviews were rea~, topic areas began 
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to develop and were immediately written down. Following the 
first reading, ideas were researched in the interview 
transcripts. This process allowed the generation of new ideas 
as well as permanently storing ideas for future analysis. 
Interviews were then reread for better clarity and under-
standing. Topic categories were then established, and the 
data was sorted into each category. The last step in the data 
analysis was to write, critique, and rewrite the text. This 
process was repeated until a finished product was achieved. 
The field data was collected in the Tidewater area 
mainly through face-to-face and telephone interviews. 
Historical data on the TRICARE program was collected during 
interviews and from command archives. This data was studied 
using qualitative methods of analysis as well as 
organizational change management models. 
C. BACltGROt1ND 
The cost of health care in the military has been 
increasing beyond what can be covered within budgcc 
authorizations. In the last five years the military medical 
communities have sought to develop innovative ways to provide 
quality health care at a lower cost. On October 1, 1991, the 
Off ice of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) published a 
memorandum titled "Strengthening the Medical Functions of the 
Department of Defense." In this memorandum, the Secretary of 
Defense stated that "with increasingly tight constraints on 
4 
resources available for the national defense, the Department 
must aggressively pursue actions to execute its vital missions 
more effectively, including its medical mission." Also in 
this memorandum he directs the implementation of several 
organizational changes, one specifically being a Coordinated 
Care Program (CCP). As a result, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) initiated the Tri-Services Coordinated Care (TRICARE) 
program in the Tidewater area of Virginia. 
D. RESBARCB QtJBSTIONS 
There were no specific interview questions as this 
research began. This study was intended to be freely 
structured in order to remain receptive to current issues 
related to the TRICARE program. 
taken to the field were: 
Thus, the broad questions 
1. What lead the military to change the way they provide 
health care and implement the Coordinated Care Program? 
2. Why did the military medical cormnunity choose the 
Tidewater area as the site for the Coordinated Care 
Program? 
3. What were the critical change issues that surfaced during 
the implementation of the TRICARE program? 
4. What specific techniques were used to manage and 
facilitate the change from the traditional delivery of 
health care to the managed care/coordinated care system. 
5 
B. ORGANIZATION OP TBB TBBSIS 
Following the introduction chapter, this thesis is 
organized into five chapters. Chapter II discusses the 
history of health care in the public sector and culminates 
with the delivery of health care in the military, specifically 
the Navy. Chapter III contains information on the Department 
of Defense's shift towards joint operations in the military 
services, and how this has lead to successful programs like 
TRICARE. The TRI CARE program and the issues that created this 
inunense reorganization will be discussed. Chapter IV 
discusses the TRICARE management structure and outlines how 
working groups can be used to assist managers to implement 
change in an organization. Chapter V contains an analysis of 
TRICARE's use of working groups and Chapter VI concludes the 
thesis with conclusions and recommendations. 
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II. HISTORY OP llBDICD1B 
A. DBVBLOPKBNT OP CIVIL ID BBALTB CARB 
This section will provide a chronological account of the 
development of health care within the civilian sector from the 
1700's to the present. It will show the cyclical pattern of 
medical emphasis from family medicine to specialization back 
• 
to family practice. The current need for general 
practitioners, or "family physicians• is shown by the 
increasing use of managed care or Health Maintenance 
Organizations. The preponderance of historical information 
contained in this section is taken from The Social 
Transformation of American Medicine by Paul Starr. 
1. 1700'&: TllB PAKILY'S ROLB IR MBDICD1B 
In Eighteenth Century America, a physician practiced 
medicine in an extremely competitive environment, competing 
not only with other physicians but also with the family 
institution. Although a doctor's ambition was to develop a 
strong reputation and a close relationship with his patients, 
the family in early American society was the focal point of 
social and economic life. Women had the responsibility to 
care for the ill in her family. This family focus made it 
difficult for physicians to establish themselves as necessary 
agents to heal the sick. As the years went on, medical books 
7 
and journals were published and circulated around town to 
assist women in diagnosing and preventing disease for her 
family. Books such as Domestic Medicine, written by William 
Buchan, set forth in layman's terms information on current 
diseases and medical advice on preventive medicine. These 
types of books challenged the authority of medical 
professionals by alleging that families could care for 
themselves. 
America, at this time, was a rapidly changing and 
expanding society. Professional physicians wanted to 
establish an elite and distinct society of professional 
doctors, similar to that of England. In England, not everyone 
could practice medicine. Physicians had specific requirements 
they had to meet to practice. Physicians in America also 
wanted to establish boundaries around the practice of medicine 
to prevent laymen from engaging in such endeavors. These 
boundaries included the requirement to earn a degree in 
medicine and obtain a license to practice. Unfortunately, the 
boundaries between profession and trade, physician and layman 
that so assiduously preserved the profession in Britain were 
not as clear in America. Gradually, Americans who were 
seriously interested in practicing medicine went to Europe for 
advanced medical education, since none existed in this 
country. This proactive movement towards establishing quality 
medical practices motivated local governments to protect the 
profession with legislative initiatives. 
8 
One such initiative occurred in 1765 when the first 
medical school was chartered at the College of Philadelphia in 
Pennsylvania. Although few schools existed at this time, many 
physicians hoped that by establishing medical schools in 
America, they would be able to create for themselves a 
respected profession. Initially, medical schools offered both 
bachelor's and doctoral degrees in medicine, but it soon 
became clear that most students graduating with a bachelor's 
degree did not return for their doctorate degree. Since most 
doctors felt confident practicing medicine with only a 
bachelor's degree, the status and respect that might be gained 
with advanced education was not realized. Although physicians 
wanted boundaries set for practicing medicine, the American 
government, with its massively expanding population, did not 
have the political means to enforce many requirements. 
2. 1800's: TBB GROWTH OP PROPBSSIOHAL KBDICINB 
As America grew, people's social and economic life 
styles changed. The tightly knit family circle that once 
centered on a small piece of land started to change. Family 
members began moving out of the area to start a new life on 
their own. As the family became more geographically 
separated, they lost their close bond during times of illness. 
People conversely became more dependent on the physician for 
medical care. The relationship between the doctor and his 
patient began to grow strong. 
9 
At the turn of the century another change was also 
starting to take form. The social distance between the doctor 
and patient started increasing while the rapport between 
practicing physicians grew closer. The goverrunent finally 
recognized the medical profession as legitimate, and 
boundaries to protect their practice were beginning to be 
enforced. 
Unfortunately, American hospitals at the start of the 
nineteenth century were considered dangerous places to go if 
you were sick. They were viewed as institutions for the 
mentally ill, not the physically ill. Many felt it was safer 
to stay at home with your family and wait for the family 
doctor to make a house call. Consequently, hospitals were 
rarely used for treatment of the physically sick. In 
addition, the levels of medical technology were very 
elementary compared to today, and most everything that could 
be done in a hospital could also be done in the home during a 
house call. Most people who resided far from town did not 
seek out doctors for treatment of their ills, and unless 
doctors made house calls, traveling to a doctor's office could 
mean an entire day's work lost for the patient (during the 
l800's, paid sick days were not a benefit given to workers). 
Physicians, on the other hand, made valiant attempts to make 
house calls in hopes of reaching the people, curing the sick, 
and providing themselves with an adequate source of income. 
Because of the time required to travel from patient to off ice 
10 
to patient, physicians found it difficult to support 
themselves by practicing medicine as their sole source of 
income. Many local doctors were also the phannacist, and 
surgeons were of ten the town barber. Autobiographies of 
doctors practicing medicine in the nineteenth century state 
that most of their day was spent traveling along back country 
roads, "half ... in the mud and the other half in the dust." 
The "transportation revolution" in the mid-nineteenth 
century really benefitted the practice of medicine. The 
railroads brought patients into the city faster and cheaper. 
This ma.de it easier for them to be treated by a physician. 
Street cars used in the cities saved valuable time for both 
the patient and the doctor. Doctors usually established 
thernsel ves along street car routes ma.king access easier. This 
"transportation revolution" helped physicians expand the 
territory that they could cover. Also, the telephone ma.de its 
debut in the 1870's ma.king it easier and more affordable to 
reach physicians. The first rudimentary telephone exchange on 
record, built in 1877, connected the Capital Avenue Drugstore 
in Hartford, Connecticut with twenty-one local doctors. Drug 
stores in those days were considered message centers for 
doctors. This transportation revolution also decreased the 
cost of medical care and put care within the income range of 
most people. 
New technologies developed during the nineteenth 
century included advances in automobiles, hard roads, 
11 
telephones and railroads. This enabled physicians to cut 
travel time and allowed them to spend more time with their 
patients. It also meant less time out of a patient's busy day 
to visit the doctor. cutting transportation costs (and time) 
directly raised the supply of physicians' services by 
increasing the proportion of the physician's time that could 
be spent with the patient. 
The close of the nineteenth century saw a greater 
reliance on hospitals for providing medical care. Urban 
growth led to higher property taxes, and consequently, people 
in or near the city moved into smaller homes and apartments. 
Smaller places to live made it more difficult to care for the 
acutely ill at home. Many times, there was simply not enough 
room. However, the dangers of infection in general hospitals 
because of poor hospital hygiene led families to manage 
physical illness at home if at all possible. It wasn't until 
after the Civil War that hospital hygiene improved. 
3. 1900'&: TBB BVOLUTIOH OP MAHAGBD CA.RB 
As America entered the twentieth century, society 
transformed from a predominantly agricultural economy to a 
manufacturing economy. The manufacturing economy gave rise to 
big businesses over small, family-owned operations causing a 
shift in focus from the individual to that of institutional 
domination. [Ref l:p. 3] 
12 
During the last fifty years, society in every developed 
country has become a society of institution. Every major 
task whether performance or health care, education or 
protection of the environment, the pursuit of new 
knowledge or defense, is today being entrusted to big 
organizations, designed for perpetuity and managed by 
their own management. [Ref l:p. 3] 
Simultaneously, in the medical arena, a historical 
transition from generalist to specialist occurred. This 
transition set the seed for corporate management of medical 
care. Specialized medicine quickly began to unfold during 
World War II. With the surge of new technology, physicians 
started to specialize in certain areas of medicine. There was 
an increasing emphasis on medical training and facilities, and 
physicians released from military service were taking 
residency in various specialties. At the end of World War II, 
practicing specialists started to flood the market as 100,000 
medical personnel (not all physicians) were released from 
active duty during the post war downsizing. By 1966, almost 
70% of all practicing physicians called themselves specialists 
leaving 30% as generalists. 
Specialists began to practice in groups instead of 
working on their own. The costs of providing medical care, 
advances in technology, scientific evolution, and other 
economic forces were the main catalyst for this shift. 
Physicians began to purchase expensive equipment as a group 
rather than practice on their own and bear all the expense. 
13 
Managed medical care has been developing for the last 
60 years, and group practice has evolved into popular 
marketable entities called Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMO) and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO) . These 
organizations, growing successfully on group payment and 
preventive medical care, inspired several prepaid group 
practice plans to evolve. From 1930-1960 these organizations 
prospered but not without opposition from organized medicine 
(such as the AMA). Even when direct service prepaid plans 
were controlled by physicians, the AMA disapproved of them as 
a form of unethical contract practice. In fact, the AMA, in 
1937, opposed the Group Health Association in Washington D.C. 
so vehemently that they fought it in court by charging that it 
violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. When court action 
failed, they threatened reprisals against any doctor who 
worked for the plan, prevented them from obtaining 
consultations and referrals and succeeded in persuading every 
hospital in the District to deny them admitting privileges. 
This succeeded in cutting off group members of the cooperative 
from hospital care. 
The Kaiser-Permanente Medical Care Program originated 
in 1942 and is considered, by far, the largest, most widely 
distributed and best known HMO in the country. [Ref l:p. 4] 
An HMO is a delivery system with a mission to provide high 
quality health and medical services at a competitive price. 
Competition is the key variable in the mission statement. The 
14 
basic principles of management; planning, organizing, 
directing, controlling and coordinating all lend themselves to 
carrying out the stated mission through the use of alternative 
provider systems such as HMO's and PPO's. [Ref l:p. 7] The 
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) , by definition, is 
slightly different from a Health Maintenance Organization 
(HMO) . A PPO is "a contractual arrangement between 
professional and/or institutional health care providers and 
employers, insurance carriers or third-party administrators to 
provide health care services to a defined population at 
established fees." [Ref l:p. 5) HMO's and PPO's represent a 
competitive form of bureaucratic organization in medical care. 
[Ref 2:p. 27] By mid 1979, there were 217 HMO's operating 
across the nation with a total enrollment of 7. 9 million 
people. This figure had doubled in size since 1970. Clearly, 
a primary reason that HMO's have been so successful is that 
physicians have been able to accept some financial risk - the 
financial risk associated with providing medical care and 
services to a group of subscribers. Both profits and losses 
are shared by all the physicians. 
As we move toward the end of the twentieth century, 
there is a growing concern that there are too many specialists 
and not enough generalists to provide adequate care for the 
nation at a reasonable cost. There is a strong consensus that 
primary care physicians are the foundation to an effective 
health care system. current interest among physicians to 
15 
practice primary care is very low. One possible reason is 
purely financial; another is related to status. Specialists 
tend to make more money than generalists and their advanced 
training in a specialized field gain them more status as a 
physician. Almost all young internists today have their 
ambitions tied to becoming a specialist. The percentage of 
practicing primary care physicians is a staggering 32%. That 
leaves 68% of the physicians practicing in a specialized 
field. [Ref 3:p. 380] 
In contrast to other industrialized nations, the 
percentage of specialist and generalist is balanced at 50%. 
Health indicators show that in comparing costs, other 
countries do as well or better in providing the care at lower 
cost. Additionally, the percentage of physicians graduating 
from U.S. medical schools who are declaring generalist fields 
has drastically declined from 36% in 1982 to 14% in 1992. 
This is significant to analyze since successful models for an 
effective national managed health care system requires a 
ration of 35% specialists and a 65% generalist physician 
distribution (see Figures 2 and 3). [Ref 3:p. 380] 
The 1980's ended with the nation realizing the need to 
develop awareness and incentives for physicians to practice 
primary care, in general, and family care practice in 
particular. Major issues pertinent to family practice in 1989 
include passage of Medicare physician payment reform and the 
development of student interest initiatives. These 
16 
PROJECTED HEAL TH CARE COSTS 
FORFY-93 ($1881 
CHAMPUS - $3.58 (21.9%) 
DIRECT CARE - $12.58 (78.t%) 
FIGURE 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECT 
CARE COSTS FOR FY-93 ($12 .58) 
GENERAL COSTS - SS (24.0%) 
( } 
MEDICAL CARE (78.0%~ 
FIGURE 3 
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initiatives give financial incentive to students to become 
general practitioners, family physicians, etc. [Ref 4:p 2643] 
As the 1990's begin to unfold, it becomes even more 
critical to promote student interest in family practice. This 
is particularly important as our society places greater 
emphasis on continuity of care, preventive medicine and health 
promotion. Unfortunately, 14\ of graduating "generalist" 
medical students is far too few to meet expected demands for 
their services. Making the situation even worse, nearly 
24,000 family and general practice physicians are now over 55 
years of age and will retire in the near future. [Ref 4:p. 
2643] 
As we attempt to find ways to increase accessibility 
to care, reduce medical costs and continue to maintain high 
quality standards of care, increasing the number of primary 
care physicians is one solution. David Meltzer in his article 
Are Generalists the Answer for Primary Care identifies that 
use of primary care physicians with an emphasis on preventive 
medicine and health promotion can result in fewer emergent 
hospital admissions, shorter lengths of stay, lower medical 
costs, wider access to care, and overall greater patient 
satisfaction. Another solution could be to increase the 
specialists' function ~o include primary care. Specialists 
could then provide primary care/family care while treating 
specific patient problems as well. This would reduce the 
numbe~· of referrals, decrease multiple workups and ultimately 
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improve the continuity and coordination of care. Expanding 
primary care to specialists can be accomplished in less time 
than would training a new generation of generalists. [Ref 5: 
p. 1714] 
It is clear that America needs to provide better 
primary care for its citizens. This is the objective behind 
President Clinton's new national health plan. As we 
collectively improve the nation's health care system, why not 
cultivate more specialists to practice primary care instead of 
training more physicians to be generalists. 
President Clinton has launched a nationwide effort to 
find an acceptable new balance of competing public demands to 
reinvent heal th care in ways that provide somewhat less 
freedom for patients and doctors with more cost control while 
still providing quality care. Costs for health spending have 
been on the rise for at least four decades. Between 1965 and 
1991 health spending has risen from 5.9 to 13.2 percent of the 
Gross Domestic Product. During the same time frame, health 
care costs have gone from 2.6 percent to 16 percent of federal 
outlays, and if no changes occur, could reach 25% by the year 
2000. [Ref 6:p. 31) 
The Department of Defense has also begun to pursue 
innovative approaches to reinvent their health care delivery 
system. There are various satellite projects ongoing 
throughout the United States such as the TRICARE Demonstration 
Project in Virginia. Reinventing the delivery of health care 
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is a major undertaking for any organization, especially the 
military. The remainder of this chapter will provide a brief 
history in chronological order of the practice of medicine in 
the military. It will focus primarily on the Navy's Military 
Health Service System (MHSS) . 
B. DBVBLOPMBN'l' OP MILITARY llBALTBCARB 
This section takes a look at the development of medical 
practice first in the Navy and then within the Department of 
Defense (DOD). The history of Navy medicine begins in 1775 
with the commissioning of the Navy's first warships. This 
discussion will develop into current trends in medical 
practice within the DOD. 
1. History of Navy Medicine. 
Navy medicine has progressed in much the same way as 
medicine has in the civilian sector. The mission of today's 
Navy Medical Department is to "ensure the health of our Navy 
and Marine Corps personnel so that they are physically and 
mentally ready to carry out their worldwide mission." 
[Ref 7:p. 2] Today's Military Health Services System (MHSS) 
is a large, complex organization. It consists of over 400,000 
personnel in the active duty, reserve and civilian workforce. 
It operates over 148 hospitals and medical centers and more 
than 800 medical and dental clinics all over the world. Total 
eligible beneficiaries total over 9 million people. 
[Ref 8 :p. 22) 
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Ever since 1775 when the Continental Congress 
commissioned its first warships, the Navy has provided medical 
support for its sailors and Marines. During that time, a 
civilian was appointed as ship's surgeon and was authorized 
for service on the ship. They were professional gentlemen, 
not officers and not sailors. Surgeons and surgeon's mates 
were hired simply for the duration of a cruise and discharged 
on its completion. They were tasked with only the immediate 
treatment of disease and injury. Their main goal was to keep 
as many crewmen as possible battle ready. [Ref 9:p. 10] In 
fact, between 1775 and 1842 there was no formal organization 
to sponsor and promote Navy medicine. In 1822, the first 
standards were established for entrance into the medical 
corps. Courses of instruction in naval hygiene and military 
surgery were developed for newly commissioned medical 
officers. It wasn't until 1842 that the Navy was reorganized 
and The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery {BUMED) established. 
Prior to 1842, Navy medical personnel had limited 
status within the organization but no rank. Physicians began 
requesting what was called assimilated rank. They wanted to 
be commissioned as Navy officers with the rank of either 
Assistant Surgeon, Passed Assistant Surgeon, Surgeon or Fleet 
Surgeon. This proposal was extremely unpopular with the line 
officers who felc that their status as military officers was 
being jeopardized. In 1846, the Secretary of the Navy issued 
an order providing for assimilated rank. From then on, 
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medical officers would rank with line offices of comparable 
seniority, although their rank titles would be different. 
[Ref 9:p. 14-15] 
The 1900's brought great organizational change within 
the medical department. Increased attention was paid to 
requiring inoculations for small pox and typhoid. 
Postgraduate and specialization training were instituted and 
greater attention was paid to infectious disease control and 
sanitation. In 1908 the Nurse Corps was established and in 
1912 the Dental Corps. In 1940, with the authorization of a 
"two-ocean" Navy, the need arose for greater focus on 
logistics and medical supply, medical mobility, and casualty 
evacuation. Mobile field hospitals with anywhere from 10 to 
3,000 beds were developed and staffed. Hospital ships were 
made to be as fully functional as a large shore-based 
facility. All major U.S. Naval vessels were embarked with 
full medical capability and even small vessels carried at 
least one corpsman on independent duty. Great advances in 
combat casualty care are clearly shown by their effects on 
survival: at least half of all men wounded in battle prior to 
World War I died from their injuries; during World War II, 98t 
of the wounded recovered. [Ref 9:p. 3] 
During World War II the Medical Department grew from 
13,000 to 170,000, but by July of 1946, 100,000 were 
discharged. One of the most important Navy medical initiative 
of the time was the establishment of the Medical Service Corps 
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in 1947. With the addition of nuclear weapons to many 
countries' arsenals, important advances were made in the areas 
of radiation exposure and health surveillance programs. 
Increased priority was also given to defense against injury by 
chemical, biological and radiological warfare agents. 
The attack of North Korea across the 38th parallel in 
1950 brought new difficulties for the medical department. 
After the post World War II downsizing, the Medical 
Department found itself preoccupied with peacetime hospital 
practice. An amendment to the Selective Service Act was 
necessary to provide enough physicians and dentists to support 
combat forces in Korea. Tri-service coordination was used to 
procure medical equipment and supplies and provide more 
effective operational and logistics support. Casualty 
survival rate again increased with the ability to provide a 
ready supply of whole blood and blood derivatives to combat 
areas. With the institution of the all volunteer military 
force after the Vietnam conflict, recruiters found their pools 
of physician volunteers empty. Because of this, the Armed 
Forces Health Professions Scholarship P~~gram and the School 
of Medicine at the Uniforrn.ed Services University of Health 
Sciences were established. During the post Vietnam exodus of 
physicians, the Navy also found itself severely short of 
general medical officers and had to use specialists as 
generalists. To respond to the urgent need for more general 
medical officers (and provide for career advancement of senior 
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enlisted corpsmen), the Warrant Officer Physician's Assistant 
Program was established. To enhance physician retention, 
promotions were accelerated and special pay was increased. 
[Ref 7: pp. 4-5] 
2 • current Trends. 
Ever since the 1800' s the Medical Department's funding 
has come from appropriations from the federal budget. Today, 
free health care for active duty military personnel is, by 
law, a right. Therefore, all care provided to active duty 
personnel comes through the direct care system (military 
treatment facilities} or is paid for by it. Dependents of 
active duty personnel are also eligible for direct care but 
only when such care is available. When care is not 
available, most non-active duty beneficiaries can use the 
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services 
(CHAMPUS) . Those eligible to use CHAMPUS include active duty 
dependents and retirees under age 65, their dependents and 
survivors (active duty members are not eligible for CHAMPUS) . 
Under CHAMPUS guidelines, if direct care is not available, 
beneficiaries are directed to see civilian providers with most 
of the costs being covered by CHAMPUS funds. 
Defense health care costs are rising fast. In 1984, 
DOD spent approximately $7.2 billion on military healthcare 
and in 1990 just over $14 billion. In 1993, DOD will spend 
well over $16 billion on military health care. Twelve and 
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one-half billion dollars will be spend on direct care. Direct 
care costs include pay and benefits of the military and 
civilian health care providers and the costs for operating and 
maintaining the direct care system. The remaining $3. 5 
billion will be consumed by CHAMPUS. Nine and a half billion 
of the 12.5 billion direct care dollars are directly related 
to providing peacetime medical care to beneficiaries, and the 
remaining expenses are general costs associated with 
maintaining a medical establishment such as military 
construction or costs of having a medical supply war reserve 
(see Figures 4 and S) . 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts that, 
if no changes in military health care policies take place, 
health care costs will continue to rise over the next few 
years despite the drawdown in forces. Even if active-duty 
personnel are reduced to 1.4 million in 1997, peacetime health 
costs are still predicted to rise from $9.5 billion in 1993 to 
$11. 6 billion. 
During the current drawdown of military forces, more 
than 24 military hospitals are shutting their doors as the 
bases they are attached to close (this does not include 
clinics or small medical facilities) . As direct care becomes 
less available as the number of Military Treatment Facilities 
(MTF) decrease, more beneficiaries are being driven into the 
civilian community for care. This is causing a direct impact 
on the number of CHAMPUS claims being filed. The number of 
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CHAMPUS users has dropped from 6 million in 1988 to 5. 9 
million in 1992. This is mainly due to the recent reduction 
in force and the associated decrease in military dependents. 
Al though the number of users has decreased, the number of 
claims filed has increased by over 65t (see Figure 6) . [Ref 
ll:p. 14] 















One way to control these rising CHAMPUS costs is to 
reduce the number of eligible beneficiaries. A second, more 
feasible approach, is to decrease the need to use civilian 
healthcare providers by improving the availability of care in 
existing MTF' s. This would involve a new way of managing 
military health care and was the catalyst for the DOD' s 
Coordinated Care Program (CCP). 
27 
III. TBB DBVBLOPIOD1T 01' xutAGBD CUB Dt DOD 
A. IHTR.ODUCTION. 
With the epilogue of the Cold War comes a new security 
strategy for the United States. This strategy requires all 
military services to join together and work as a cohesive 
group to conduct a new variety of contingency operations, The 
services need to understand that in order to meet the military 
challenges of the future, a joint strategy is imperative; a 
strategy that emanates inter-service cooperation. 
Consequently, joint ingenuity and action will be essential. 
Current u .s. military doctrine addresses the need to focus 
on a variety of threats involving more numerous, less capable 
enemy forces. This is a vast change from the long standing 
doctrine which focused on a single superpower (primarily the 
former Soviet Union}. With the active drawdown of U.S. 
military forces, the services must now be able to accomplish 
their missions with smaller forces and fewer bases. 
Each service will be required to fight as part of ad hoc 
coalitions or to work with traditional partners outside 
existing alliance lines. In addition, mission 
requirements will be far more complex and diverse, running 
the gamut from disaster relief, humanitarian relief, 
nation assistance, and peacekeeping to forced-entry 
operations and high-intensity armored warfare all in a 
single theater of operations~all at the same time. [Ref 
12:p. 56] 
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To compound these new mission challenges, all service 
departments are being given less money with which to operate 
(including the medical departments}. With this in mind, 
highly trained forces, successfully operating at the lowest 
possible cost will be the military's key to success in meeting 
the needs of the nation's security. 
This chapter will address three issues. The first gives 
a background of past and current trends in the strategy and 
mission of the Department of Defense and its current policy 
promoting joint operations. This discussion will include, but 
will not be limited to, military operations. It will then 
~xplore the emerging joint strategies and policies within the 
Department of Defense concerning health care and the operation 
of military treatment facilities. This chapter will conclude 
with a description of the TRICARE demonstration project. 
B. BACKGROUND. 
1. Joint Operations in Military Departments. 
For the past 45 years military joint contingency 
operations were not conducted on a routine basis. Since the 
end of the Korean War, each military service has had clearly 
defined responsibilities and the strategic focus of each was 
explicitly recognized. The National Security Act of 1948 
clearly spelled out each service's role - to man, train and 
equip forces to operate on land (Department of the Army} , 
operate on and from the sea and conduct land operations 
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essential to Naval campaigns (Department of the Navy) and 
conduct offensive and defensive air operations (Department of 
the Air Force) . 
During the Cold War, the services developed habitual 
relationships with each other primarily due to the 
traditional, single strategic focus aimed at the European 
theater. It was then a predictable world of distinct threats 
and clear cut missions. A generation of soldiers, sailors, 
Marines and airmen became accustomed to the scenario of war 
against the Soviet Union. Most all efforts and training were 
centered on this Cold War posture. Navy officers knew the sea 
lanes of the North Atlantic inside and out. Likewise, Army 
and Air Force officers found little change in war plans by 
being assigned to the same bases in Europe over and over 
again. 
Compared to the traditional Cold War, the current 
threat is not as clearly defined. The 1993 National Military 
Strategy of the United States sums it up best. 
For most of the past 45 years the primary focus of our 
national military strategy has been containment of the 
Soviet Union and its conmunist ideology -- we met that 
challenge successfully. Over the short span of the past 
3 years, the Berlin Wall fell; the Warsaw Pact dissolved; 
Germany reunified; democracy took hold in Eastern Europe 
and grew stronger in Latin America; and international 
coalition successfully reversed Iraqi aggression; and the 
Soviet Union ceased to exist as communism collapsed as an 
ideology and as a way of life. . . . Future threats to 
U.S. interests are inherent in the uncertainty and 
instability of a rapidly changing world. 
-Gen Colin L. Powell, Chairman, JCS 
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The current U.S. military mission calls for a focus on 
a more diverse, flexible strategy. U.S. military leaders are 
actively pursuing innovative concepts that promote inter-
service cooperation. " ... From The Sea" is one such example. 
The white paper, signed by Admiral Frank B. Kelso II (Chief of 
Naval Operations) and General Carl E. Mundy (Commandant of the 
Marine Corps) charts out the Navy's new strategic concept for 
the 21st Century. Joint Pub 1, titled "Joint Warfare of the 
Armed Forces," specifically outlines the DOD's current 
guidance on joint operations as follows: 
Joint Pub 1 guides the joint action of the Armed Forces of 
the United States, presenting concepts molding those Armed 
Forces into the most effective joint fighting force. 
Service troops are being employed more and more under joint 
force commanders. Recently, Operations Just Cause and Desert 
Storm have shown that American forces can work jointly and be 
truly successful. Services have constructed joint committees 
to foster inter-service cooperation and eliminate barriers to 
joint inter-operability. 
Unfortunately, habitual relationships that develop 
between individuals and groups can cause difficulties when 
those individ·-ials or groups are asked to work outside their 
normal rfE!lationships. The U.S. military is no exception. Old 
habits are hard to break, and getting ships, planes, tanks and 
most importantly, service men and women to work together in 
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joint and combined operations cannot happen overnight. 
Contingency and daily operations with various pieces of each 
service, mo2ded together should be the standard and not the 
exception. 
Additionally, with the downsizing of the military and 
fewer defense dollars to go around, the services can 
accomplish their respective missions and national objectives 
collectively at a lower cost. Innovation can breed success 
that is also affordable. These successes not only serve the 
combat arms but can serve the military medical community as 
well. 
2. Joint Operations in the Medical Community. 
The cost of health care in the military has been 
increasing beyond what can be covered within budget 
constraints. 
Military medical costs have risen twice as fast as any 
other military cost. One main reason: the armed forces 
and the Veteran Affairs having to pay increasingly larger 
amounts to private health-care providers now being used to 
supplement in-house military care. [Ref 13:p. 45] 
There are three factors causing an increase in the use of 
civilian providers. These are: (1) closure of military 
hospitals, (2) decreasing hospital budgets, (3) and decreasing 
hospital staff. These three factors have caused access to 
direct care services to become severely limited. As a result, 
the military is being compelled to apply joint principles to 
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develop innovative ways to provide accessible, quality health 
care at affordable costs. 
Another reason for the increased use of civilian 
providers is the increase in the number of dependent and 
retiree beneficiaries. One of the biggest changes in the last 
25 years to effect health care delivery was the adoption of 
the all volunteer force. Prior to the 1970's, the military 
could more selectively choose its members and the force was 
composed predominantly of single men and women. Institution 
of the all volunteer force brought a much larger number of 
married volunteers. This resulted in an increased numbers of 
dependent beneficiaries. Along with this trend came an 
increase in the number of beneficiaries retiring from service 
during and after World War II and the Korean war. With the 
Reagan administration came a dramatic increase in the size of 
the military force and a corresponding increase in health care 
costs (more people = more health care required) . 
The Civilian Health and Medical Program for the 
Uniform Services (CHAMPUS) was introduced in the 1950' s. 
Initially, CHAMPUS costs were relatively low because most 
beneficiaries were active duty and could be cared for using 
military direct care facilities. As the years went on, and 
the number of beneficiaries (specifically active duty 
dependents and retirees) began to increase, demand for medical 
care began to rise beyond the capacity of the military 
facilities. Up until 1987 referrals by military medical 
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commands to the civilian community under CHAMPUS were paid by 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Consequently, 
the military medical department neither incurred the direct 
costs associated with referring their patients to the civilian 
community nor saw the financial impact of it. As a result, 
each year OSD had to request additional funds from Congress to 
cover outstanding CHAMPUS bills. [Ref 14 :p. 10) In 1988 
Congress shifted responsibility for funding and paying CHAMPUS 
expenditures from OSD to each military service's medical 
department. Each service would receive annual CHAMPUS funding 
and be held responsible to live within their budgets and pay 
their own bills. 
As a result of this change in fiscal policy, the 
military medical conununity was compelled to develop innovative 
approaches to providing quality health care while 
simultaneously bringing escalating medical costs under 
control. Since 1988, the medical departments have been 
experimenting with different programs to solve this problem. 
The most successful program implemented to date is the joint 
coordinated "managed care" program. The goal of this program 
is to integrate all health care services to improve access to 
high quality, cost-effective care. 
C. TRICARB HISTORY 
The first meeting of the Joint Services/Off ice of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Health Affairs Task Force for 
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Coordinated Care Operations took place in June 1990. This 
group specifically addressed the need to establish a managed 
care system in the Tidewater area. In September 1990, the 
initial meeting of the tri-service MTF commanders (at Langley 
AF Base, Fort Eustis and NMC, Portsmouth) took place to 
discuss the concept of establishing a coordinated cachement 
area management project in Tidewater. 
Although this is the first truly tri-service coordinated 
care effort, there have been several other programs aimed at 
controlling growing health care costs. One of these is 
Cachement Area Management. Within the 1988 CHAMPUS 
reallocation, Congress authorized a Cachement Area Management 
(CAM) demonstration project aimed at controlling growing 
CHAMPUS costs. Five separate {single service) military sites 
were selected to participate in the 3-year CAM demonstration: 
two Army, two Air Force and one Navy. Four primary objectives 
of the project were to: 
1. contain the rate of growth in CHAMPUS costs; 
2. improve accessibility to health care; 
3. improve satisfaction with health care; and 
4. maintain quality of health care. [Ref lS:p.11] 
Still other initiatives (all joint arrangements) include the 
Joint Military Medical Command in San Antonio, TX (Army-Air 
Force), the Delaware Valley Health Services System (DV-HSS) 
(Army/Air Force/Navy) and the San Francisco Medical Command 
(SFMC) (Army/Air Force/Navy). Although the DV-HSS and the 
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SFMC were tri-service, they were not managed/coordinated care 
programs. They still have long lists of sharing and 
cooperative efforts that serve as examples for others to 
follow. 
To speed the progress of the TRICARE project, the Navy 
assembled a Rapid Implementation Team (RIT) in August 1991. 
Members of the team had expertise in the areas of 
conununications, procurement, managed care and information 
systems. The RIT was comprised of nine military officers; 
seven Navy, one Army Reserve Medical Service Officer and one 
Air Force Physician. 
On October 1, 1991, The Office of the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) published a memorandum titled "Strengthening the 
Medical Functions of the Department of Defense." In this 
memorandum, he stated that 
with increasingly tight constraints on resources available 
for the national defense, the Department must pursue 
aggressively actions to execute its vital missions more 
effectively, including its medical mission. 
Also in this memorandum he directs the implementation of 
several new initiatives, one specifically being a Coordinated 
Care Program (CCP). The memorandum states: 
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Heal th Affairs 
shall implement a program to ensure coordination wit~in 
appropriate geographical areas of the provision of medical 
care in DOD facilities with the provision of medical care 
through the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the 
Uniformed Services. The objective of the program shall be 
to maximize cost-effectiveness in the delivery of high-
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quality health care in the accomplishment of the 
Department's medical mission. 
Less than one year later, on August 14, 1992, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)) published 
"Policy Guidelines On The Department of Defense Coordinated 
Care Program" which describes the CCP as a program that 
will enable the DOD and the Military Departments to better 
accomplish the medical mission by improving beneficiary 
access to health care services, controlling health care 
costs, and ensuring quality care to all Military Health 
Services System (MHSS} beneficiaries. 
Less than one month later, on October 1, 1992, TRICARE-
Tidewater began operation as its three Service Centers opened 
their doors for business; one in Portsmouth, one at Langley 
AFB and one at Ft. Eustis. 
D. TRICARB'S MISSION 
TRICARE-Tidewater is a DOD CCP whose purpose is to 
optimize the utilization of the MTF's (NMC, Portsmouth; 
McDonald Army Hospital, FT Eustis; 1st Medical Group, Langley 
AFB) as well as a highly competitive civilian healthcare 
market in the Tidewater area. Their goals are to improve 
access to quality health care for all beneficiaries using the 
Military Health Service System (MHSS}, enhance Graduate 
Medical Education and contain the increasing cost of CHAMPUS. 
TRICARE's health care delivery system is based on an HMO model 
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where patients are channeled to an appropriate level of care 
through the use of a "Gatekeeper" or primary care physician. 
B. Tlt.ICAllB ARBA 
The TRICARE cachement area is made up of a 40-mile radial 
area surrounding its three major medical facilities. These 
are the Naval Medical Center (NMC) in Portsmouth, VA, 1st 
Medical Group at Langley AFB, and McDonald Army Hospital at 
Ft. Eustis. This equates roughly to the area from Yorktown, 
VA to northern North Carolina and from the Atlantic Ocean to 
Richmond, VA. The Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth, located 
in Portsmouth, VA is the largest of the three facilities. It 
is a 446 bed tertiary care facility that sponsors many 
training, technical and graduate medical programs. The 1st 
Medical Group and McDonald Army Hospital are much smaller with 
70 and 57 beds respectively. Average annual outpatient visits 
by facility are shown in Figure 7. 
ANRUAL OUTPATIENT VISITS BY FACILITY 
Service/Facility Annual outpatient Visits• 
NAVY: NMC, PORTSMOUTH 1,253,000 
ARMY: McDONALD 260,000 
AIR FORCE: 1st MED GROUP 340 000 
*Annual figures are for PY-91 
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By virtue of the relative size of NMC, Portsmouth, the 
Navy has been designated "lead agent" for the project. In 
addition to these large medical facilities, several smaller 
clinics are part of the service area. These include Army 
clinics at Ft. Lee, Ft. Story, Ft. Monroe and Ft. Eustis; and 
Navy clinics at NAS Oceana, Dam Neck, NAB Little Creek, 
Northwest Security Group, Yorktown Naval Weapons Station, and 
Norfolk's Naval Base, Naval Shipyard and Naval Air Station. 
The Tidewater area was chosen as the first CCP site for many 
reasons. These include the large local beneficiary 
population, the in-house capacity of existing MTF's and 
clinics and the abundance of local civilian providers. 
The Tidewater area has one of the largest populations of 
military health care (including CHAMPUS) beneficiaries in the 
entire Department of Defense. The local population is made up 





They are broken up by service as shown in 
BRBAltDOWH OP BBHBPICI.AR.IBS BY SBRVICB 
ARMY KARD1BS NAVY TOTAL 
46,993 10,354 278,072 381,081 
PIGUU 8 
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Of these 381,081 beneficiaries, approximately 125,000 (33l) 
are active duty, 151,000 (40l) are active duty dependents and 
the remaining (27\) are retirees, their dependents and 
survivors. All are eligible for direct care (active duty have 
first priority, dependents second and retirees and their 
dependents/survivors third). Approximately 238,000 are 
eligible for CHAMPUS (active duty personnel and retirees over 
age 65 are not eligible) . 
The second reason the Tidewater area was chosen as the 
first CCP site is its ratio of population size to treatment 
facility capacity (comparison of supply and demand). Active 
duty military personnel are entitled, by law, to free medical 
care. It is also the policy of the medical department to 
provide all other eligible beneficiaries with free in-house 
care but only when space is available. Unfortunately, the 
demand for care in the area far exceeds the capacity of the 
local military treatment facilities. A study (simulation) was 
done to estimate the maximum capacity of the MTF's, shipboard 
medical facilities and clinics in the Tidewater area 
(shipboard facilities can only treat shipboard personnel). In 
order to show the magnitude of the shortfall, the beneficiary 
population was divided into two basic categories, active and 
non-active duty (see Figure 9). 
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B~ICDOWH OP BBNBPICIARIBS BY T'YPB OP DOTY c...i.--
ACTIVB DOTY HlJllBJUl OP BBNBPICIARIBS 
AFLOAT 61,000 
ASHORE 64,000 
NON ACTIVB DUTY 256,000 
TOTAL 381,000 
PIG1: 1U5 9 
The total estimated capacity of treatment facilities was also 
broken down into the three basic categories based on the type 
of facility. These are shipboard facilities, MTF' s and 
clinics (see Figure 10}. 
PACILITY CAPACITY vs. 7ACILITY TYPB 





PIGU us l.O 
In other words, the existing network of military 
medical facilities can care for a maximum population of 
193, 000 individuals. The local beneficiary population is 
381, 000; 125, 000 of which are active duty and have first 
priority for treatment. This leaves 256,000 dependent and 
retiree beneficiaries (381,000 total-125,000 active duty) to 
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compete for the remaining treatment capacity of 68,000 
available appointments (193,000-125,000). This leaves, on the 
average, one available appointment for every 3 non-active duty 
beneficiaries. This shortfall in capacity decreases the 
morale of beneficiaries in the area because they sometimes 
spend hours on the phone trying to get an appointment. 
Additionally, it has increased the number of non-active duty 
beneficiaries that are forced to use CHAMPUS. Since CHAMPUS 
funds pay most of the cost of treatment from civilian 
providers, as availability of direct care decreases, CHAMPUS 
costs increase. Since one of the goals of CCP is to contain 
costs and improve access to the direct care system, the 
Tidewater area is an excellent candidate for this program. 
Still another reason the Tidewater area was chosen for 
this project is its abundance of civilian health care 
providers. Within the 40-mile radius service area are 
nineteen general acute care hospitals, two children's 
hospitals, six psychiatric facilities and one orthopedic 
hospital. There is also an adequate supply of physicians 
representing all specialties. The hospitals in the Tidewater 
area range from 50-100 bed community hospitals to 500+ bed 
tertiary referral centers. The combined service offerings of 
these hospitals include all primary, secondary and tertiary 
services including trauma, open heart surgery, advanced cancer 
care, neonatal intensive care, burn care and transplant 
services. Practicing within the Tidewater service area are 
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over 2,300 non-federal physicians representing all specialty 
areas. They are predominantly solo practitioners with a small 
portion representing small, single-specialty groups. Four 
locally operated HMO' s also exist within the Tidewater service 
area. Associated with these HMO's are over 3,300 physicians 
and 53 hospitals. Some, but not all of the associated 
physicians and medical facilities are located within the 
Tidewater service area. 
The average local civilian hospital occupancy rates range 
from approximately 60% - 75%. Although percentages vary from 
hospital to hospital, most facilities within the service area 
can absorb additional inpatient capacity. These moderate 
occupancy rates coupled with the large supply of providers 
resulted in a highly competitive local health care market. As 
the laws of supply and demand apply, the DOD has an advantage 
in the Tidewater area. If local providers want to be a part 
of the Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) within the new 
TRICARE organization, they must be willing to negotiate rates 
which are lower than existing CHAMPUS rates. To date, most 
providers have been willing to do this as long as the rates 
can be tied to volume guarantees. This arrangement not only 
guarantees a regular supply of customers for the civilian 
physician, it provides the government with a significant 
savings over existing CHAMPUS fees. 
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P. TRICARB JIAHAGBllJDIT STRUCTORB 
TRICARE' s oversight responsibilities belong to the Navy as 
lead agent and more specifically to the Commander in Chief, 
U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT). The TRICARE Commanders' 
Board is responsible to CINCLANFLT for planning, implementing, 
managing, and evaluating the CCP in the Tidewater area. The 
Commanders' Board is chaired by the Commanding Officer, Naval 
Hospital, Portsmouth and consists of the Commanding Officers 
of McDonald Army Community Hospital, Fort Eustis and the 1st 
Medical Group, Langley Air Force Base (in the immediate 
future, the Commander of the local Coast Guard facility will 
join the Board) . The TRICARE Project Office is responsible to 
the Commanders' Board for the daily operations of the TRICARE 
project. 
The TRICARE Project Office is managed by an 06 Navy Line 
Officer who serves as Director and is charged with the daily 
functions and operations of the TRICARE project. The TRICARE 
Project Office has five major departments. These are the 
Resources Department, Clinical Services Review Department, the 
Plans and Operations Department, the Marketing and Public 
Relations Department and the newest department, Information 
Systems. 
G. TRICARB OPBRA'l'IOH.AL PI.AH 
TRI CARE' s operational concept is based on improving access 
to care by coordinating all of the medical resources of the 
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MI'F and civilian providers. It is also based on controlling 
health care costs by providing beneficiaries with lower cost 
alternatives to finance their medical expenses. Active duty 
personnel assigned to units in the Tidewater area will 
continue to receive their medical care from the MHSS. 
However, non-active duty beneficiaries in the Tidewater area 
will now have three managed care options available to them in 
addition to the direct care system. The three managed care 
options are; TRICAR.E Prime, TRICARE Extra, and basic CHAMPUS. 
TRICARE Prime and TRICARE Extra offer beneficiaries a 
smaller cost share percentage than CHAMPUS (i.e., dependents 
of active duty service members pay 15 percent of the 
negotiated rate as opposed to CHAMPUS's 20 percent). TRICARE 
Prime provides the same benefits available under CHAMPUS with 
additional benefit enhancements. These enhancements include 
periodic examinations and preventive care procedures that are 
not covered under CHAMPUS. Beneficiaries wishing to use 
TRICARE Prime are enrolled into the program and required to 
pay an annual enrollment fee instead of paying the normal 
CHAMPUS deductible. Enrollees are given the choice of an 
individual provider, a group practice, a clinic, or a 
treatment site participating in the PPO as their primary care 
manager who will act as a "gatekeeper" for specialty 
referrals. 
TRICARE Extra covers the same medical services as CHAMPUS. 
In addition, beneficiaries choosing this option receive 
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discounts for off ice visits and hospital inpatient care by 
using the PPO. Providers belonging to tl,e PPO network of fer 
predetermined rates lower than the CHAMPUS allowable rates. 
This plan gives the beneficiaries more freedom when choosing 
a provider as well as the financial plan because they do not 
have to enroll. Patients may choose to receive their care 
through TRICARE Extra, standard CHAMPUS, or the direct care 
system on a case-by-case basis. 
If beneficiaries choose to use one of the TRICARE 
packages, they will be treated by a qualified health care 
provider that belongs to the Preferred Provider Network in the 
Tidewater area. The Preferred Provider Network as well as all 
the MTF' s and clinics are integrated through the TRICARE 
Service Centers. 
The Service Center functions as the hub of the managed 
care program in the Tidewater area. There is one Service 
Center located at or near each of the three MTF's. With a 
single phone call to one of these Service Centers, 
beneficiaries can schedule medical appointments in the MTF's, 
clinics, or at a civilian health care provider who belongs to 
the PPO network. Also, beneficiaries can receive information 
on medical benefits and assistance with medical claims and 
forms processing. The Service Centers can be the most 
critical component of the TRICARE program since it is the 
element with which beneficiaries will interact the most. 
However, for the overall TRICARE-Tidewater project to be 
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successful, TRICARE and hospital administrators must 
effectively manage the implementation of change within their 
organizations. They must employ change management techniques 
that will make the transition from the traditional delivery of 
healthcare to the managed care method as smooth as possible. 
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL CllAHGBS AND TllB '1'BAll APPROACH 
There is nothing that can replace the special intelligence 
that a worker has about the workplace. No matter how 
smart a boss is or how great a leader, he/she will fail 
miserably in tapping the potential of employees by working 
against employees instead of with them. 
-Ronald Contino, former Deputy Commissioner 
New York City Sanitation Department 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
On October 1, 1992, the DOD medical community began an 
integral change with the implementation of its Coordinated 
Care Program {CCP). The CCP brings with it a significant, 
innovative change in the way DOD medical facilities operate. 
According to Richard L. Daft, author of Organization Theory 
and Design, for any new idea to be adopted by an organization, 
certain activities must be completed. If any elements are 
missing, the change process will fail. Among these elements 
are: 
1. Identification of a Need, 
2. Discovery of an Idea, 
3. Adoption of the Idea, 
4. Implementation. 
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A need exists when managers are dissatisfied with current 
organizational performance. In the case of TRI CARE, a 
definite need existed since "managers" (beneficiaries, 
hospital administrators, Congressmen, ASD (HA) , etc.) were 
dissatisfied with the performance of the military health care 
delivery system in general and specifically in the Tidewater 
area. Most of the dissatisfaction in the area had to do with 
patients' access to care. The medical facilities (hospitals, 
clinics, etc.) were so busy that it would often take the 
patient days of calling the appointment desk to secure an 
appointment. The phone was usually busy and when one did get 
through, no appointments were available in the direct care 
system. When this occurred, patients would have to go into 
the local community and use CHAMPUS providers. This not only 
caused beneficiaries to be unhappy, it also made the CHAMPUS 
bill rise every time civilian providers were used. Many 
beneficiaries were sufficiently disgruntled that receiving 
Congressional complaints on the quality of healthcare in the 
Tidewater area was not uncommon. One Project Office 
administrator explained the situation: 
Access to care has been a real problem (in the Tidewater 
area), there were an awful lot of Congressional complaints 
in the past, access to care was a problem .... Call on 
Monday, first of all, you can't get through, and when you 
do get through, they tell you to call back next month. . 
.. What we're trying to do is to ensure that we just do 
what is necessary in order to get the patient well .... 
There are standards that would make sense, and of course, 
contain costs .... (W)e also have extremely high 
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administrative costs in this country .... What we need 
to do is to try to improve access to care, one of the 
major problems in the area, we want to contain costs and 
we want to maintain the same quality of care. 
An idea is simply a new way of doing things. It can be 
a model, concept or plan and must have the potential to reduce 
dissatisfaction felt by "managers." In the Tidewater area, 
the Managed Care model is the idea. The idea to use the 
Managed Care model was not the choice of local Tidewater 
healthcare providers, but that of the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)). Orders 
were delineated from ASD(HA) to implement a coordinated care 
program. To assist area members in understanding and 
implementing this new idea, the Navy assembled a "rapid 
implementation team" (RIT) and sent them to TRICARE-Tidewater. 
Members of the RIT had expertise in the areas of 
conununications, procurement, information systems and, most 
importantly, managed care. Since hospital conunanders were now 
responsible for their own operating budgets, they needed a way 
to better use their resources to improve the quality of care. 
Managed Care was the vehicle chosen for this. One hospital 
conunander sees Managed Care as a good model to use to improve 
resource utilization and improve care. He said: 
( o) ur budget's going down, the number of people we' re 
taking care of is not going down; therefore, we've got to 
do something different. Managed care by, and all of its 
connotations, is the only thing we've got to do that. By 
so 
managed care I mean utilization management. I mean PPO's, 
HMO'S, etc., etc., etc. We've got to be able to do it 
better, and cheaper. And that's managed care, doing it 
better and cheaper. There is no other answer. 
Adoption occurs when decision makers choose and accept a 
proposed idea to make a change. The adoption of this idea 
occurred on October 1, 1991, when the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Health Affairs published a memorandum titled 
"Strengthening the Medical Functions of the Department of 
Defense." In this memorandum, he stated that "with 
increasingly tight constraints on resources available for the 
national defense, the Department must aggressively pursue 
actions to execute its vital missions more effectively, 
including its medical mission." (Ref lS:p.l] Also in this 
memorandum he directed the il'Clplementation of several new 
initiatives, one specifically being a Coordinated Care Program 
(CCP) in the Tidewater area. 
Implementation occurs when l1~rnbers of the organization 
actually use the new idea. It is the most difficult and the 
important step in implementing change. Unfortunately, many 
brilliant ideas are never used because they are never 
implemented. Quite often, managers fail to anticipate and 
prepare for resistance to change by consumers, managers and 
employees. No matter how impressive or logical a change 
initiative seems, it will no doubt conflict with someone's 
interests and jeopardize some alliances within the 
organization. If employees are uninf armed or mis inf armed 
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about the proposed change, uncertainty about the impact the 
change will have on an individual's job, performance and 
career will most definitely result in resistance. [Ref 18: 
p.294] The TRICARE organization must apply appropriate change 
management techniques during this implementation period to 
minimize the negative effects of resistance. 
This chapter will focus on the use of working groups as 
agents for change. It begins with a discussion of the 
management strategy that TRICARE chose to use and also a view 
of the supporting organizational structure they adopted. It 
will conclude with a discussion of TRICARE's use of the team 
approach as a mechanism for change. 
B. CONTROL vs PAR'l'ICIPATIVB JIAN'AGBllBN'l'. 
One item the TRICARE Commanders and the Project Office 
considered is the type of management strategy for their new 
organization. They could use either the traditional, military 
management strategy of control or they could view the new 
organization as a participative endeavor where people from all 
levels of the organization assist, innovate and contribute. 
The two opposing strategies, control-oriented and commitment-
oriented (participative) are polar opposite. While control-
oriented management strategy has distant ancestry in the 
bureaucracy of both the church and the military this type of 
management usually hopes for and achieves no more than mere 
compliance with standards. [Ref 16:p.78] Since the goals of 
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TRICARE (access, quality and cost containment) depend on a 
superior level of effort from everyone, it will require deep 
conunitment to the cause, not mere obedience to rules and 
regulations. 
In contrast to control, the goal of conunitment-oriented 
management is to capitalize on the efforts of a workforce that 
is truly conunitted to the goals and aspiration of the 
organization. Managers have only lately begun to see that 
workers do not respond best and most creatively when they are 
tightly controlled by management, placed in narrowly defined 
jobs, and treated like unwelcome necessities. They do, 
however, work more productively when they are given broader 
responsibilities, encouraged to contribute, and allowed to 
take satisfaction in their work. It should come as no 
surprise that eliciting worker conunitment (and providing the 
environment in which it can flourish) pays tangible dividends 
for the individual and for the organization. [Ref 16:p. 77] 
During interviews with administrators in the TRICARE 
organization, I found overwhelming agreement with the 
conunitment-based vice control-based strategy. Administrators 
of TRICARE do not simply want staff compliance with new 
organizational and operational changes, they want hospital, 
clinic and Service Center employees to feel truly conunitted to 
the project. One of the Project Officers in particular wants 
to make sure that each individual responsible for providing 
healthcare to beneficiaries enjoys their work and feels good 
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about what they do. He feels that there is a direct 
relationship between employee (provider) and customer 
(patient) satisfaction. He stated that: 
... (O)ur basic philosophy towards our plan is we're 
going to make this thing fun for our people. There's got 
to be satisfaction for the staff. That's important not 
only for the TRICARE office but for the staff at the 
hospitals. If you don't feel good about what you're 
doing, if you don't feel right, then you don't really care 
much about providing hassle-free care (to the patient) .. 
. . The basic elements of TQL, whatever you want to call 
it, I think it works. If you get people to buy into the 
system, they'll make it work. 
Another Project Officer believes that if workers are 
involved in operational changes, then they will feel more 
responsible for the product of their work. He feels that it 
is the Project Office's responsibility to provide the 
environment that will help the staff incorporate any changes 
into their daily routine. He believes that if they "own" the 
process, if they can personally feel good about what they do, 
then they will better understand why the change is taking 
place and be able to anticipate results of the change. The 
only means to this end is to allow the workers to participate 
in change implementation and change management. He stated 
that: 
(t)he function of the TRICARE Project Office is to provide 
the environment, the supportive, facilitating environment 
where we can get these people (in the different hospitals) 
together .... We give them the opportunity to do well on 
their own. . . . You can order people to do anything you 
want, but it's better if they own it, it's better if they 
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understand it and can incorporate it into their daily 
lives. You can't force people to do those kind of things. 
In support of this philosophy, TRICARE has organized several 
working groups throughout the organization to facilitate this 
change effort. Another administrator feels that 
in the spirit of TQL, you want the people, . . . the 
people where the rubber meets the road doing whatever 
it is they are doing, you want them to make the 
decisions. They know better ... because they know 
better day to day how to make the process better. 
That's why we have the working groups. 
According to Harland Cleveland, former dean of the Humphrey 
Institute at the University of Minnesota and author of The 
Knowledge Executive: 
In the old days when only a few people were well educated 
and 'in the know, ' leadership of the uninformed was likely 
to be organized in vertical structures of conunand and 
control. Leadership of the informed is different: it 
results in the necessary action only if exercised mainly 
by persuasion, bringing into consultation those who are 
going to have to do something to make the decision work. 
Physicians, technicians, nurses, and pharmacists are certainly 
not an uneducated group. They are the ninformedn to which 
Cleveland refers. TRICARE administrators need to nbring into 
consultationn those that will be affected by the change to 
make the process go more smoothly. This was the basic 
philosophy behind the development of their working groups. 
These work groups are being used to bring members from the 
different services together to work on issues relevant to 
55 
TRICARE's implementation. As initiators of change, TRICARE 
administrators need the wholehearted commitment of others; 
involving them makes very good sense as participation leads to 
commitment, not merely compliance. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL ST'lltJCTUJlB. 
In support of their use of participative management, 
TRICARE must provide their employees with the ability to 
contribute to their own and the organization's success. The 
traditional military organization is a vertical structure 
which is heavily laden with rules, regulations and standard 
operating procedures. Each hospital within the Tidewater area 
(although each is run by a different military service) is 
structured in much the same way. In order to successfully 
implement the CCP, orientation must change from the 
traditional single service, vertical perspective to that of a 
multi- service, horizontally integrated approach. The 
traditional vertical structure can still exist within each 
medical department as necessary, but horizontal integration 
between the hospitals is essential if the services are to 
coordinate efforts to meet the established TRICARE goals. 
The traditional vertical structure of any military 
hospital is depicted by its organizational chart or standard 
chain of command. The chain of command shows the vertical 
lines of authority from the Commanding Officer and links all 
personnel throughout the organization. In the traditional 
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(pre-TRICARE) sense, each hospital (NMC Portsmouth; 1st 
Medical Group, Langley; and McDonald Army Hospital, FT Eustis) 
has a separate chain of command, and the only way to cross 
organizational lines is up the chain to and through the 
Commanding Officers. Interservice communication was not 
standard practice because it was simply not necessary. One 
interviewee explained that communica~ing with his associates 
at the other hospitals was not common. He said: 
Before (TRICARE), the Navy was here, the Army was here, the 
Air Force was here and everyone lived in their own little 
world. . I didn't even know the people at the other 
(hospitals) and they didn't know me. 
This same opinion was expressed by nearly all the individuals 
that were interviewed. Each had little connection with other 
services because daily operations didn't require them to work 
together. Breaking this habitual, single service way of 
operating needed to be changed if a tri-service managed care 
operation could take place. 
The structure of TRICARE must facilitate the communication 
among departments and employees that is necessary to complete 
its mission. Since the new CCP requires a tri- service 
perspective and interservice coordination, horizontal 
communication links that not only cross departmental lines but 
also cross service boundaries are essential. 
Although the vertical chain of command structure is the 
tra.c1.tional form of military organization, implementation of 
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the CCP requires the addition of a more horizontal dimension. 
Use of horizontal communication can assist the organization in 
overcoming barriers that exist between departments, or in this 
case, between the hospitals and services. TRICARE, headed by 
the TRICARE Commanders' Board (Army, Navy and Air Force) , 
involves the delivery of health care in the Tidewater area 
through a coordinated effort by all three service hospitals, 
clinics, the VA and their established network of civilian 
providers. Achieving the desired level of interservice 
cooperation can be done in many ways, one of which is to 
establish task forces, or interservice, interdepartment 
working groups. 
TRICARE administrators wanted those who do the work to 
have a voice in implementing the changes that affect their 
specific department or division. In support of this position, 
workers must be given a way to easily coordinate with their 
counterparts in the other medical facilities. It was for this 
reason that the Federal Working Groups were formed. 
D. WORltING GROUPS. 
This section presents a discussion of the benefits of 
using working groups as agents to aid in the implementation of 
organizational change. 
J. Richard HacJana.n, author of Groups That Work (and Those 
That Don't) describes three characteristics that define work 
groups. These characteristics are: 
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Groups are intact social systems, complete with 
boundaries, interdependence among members, and 
differentiated member roles. 
Groups have one or more tasks to perform. The 
group produces some outcome for which members have 
collective responsibility and whose acceptability 
is potentially assessable. 
Groups operate in an organizational context. They 
manage relations with other individuals or groups 
in the larger social system in which the group 
operates. 
According to Hackman, effectiveness can be measured using a 
three-dimensional scale. The first measure is the degree to 
which the group's productive output (product, service, or 
decision) meets the standards of quantity, quality and 
timeliness. In other words, if a group generates output that 
is completely unacceptable to the individual(s) who receives 
the output, then it would be hard to argue that the group is 
effective. The second measure is the degree to which the 
process of carrying out the work enhances the capability of 
members to work together interdependently in the future. This 
measure is especially important to TRICAR.E since its whole 
operational concept is based on interservice cooperation. 
Groups can generate mutual antagonism so high that it becomes 
virtually impossible for those group members to work together 
again. Other groups become highly skilled at working together 
which leads to increasing levels of performance over time. 
The third and final dimension is the degree to which the group 
experience contributes to the personal growth of team members. 
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1. Bnabling Conditions. 
To perform well, all groups have hurdles they must 
surmount. Among these, each individual must: (1) exert 
sufficient effort to accomplish group tasks, (2) bring 
adequate knowledge and skill to the group and ( 3) employ 
appropriate task performance strategies. Using these 
criterion, if a group is not doing well, one can readily ask, 
"is it an effort problem, a talent problem or a group strategy 
problem?" 
Another item that impacts group effectiveness include 
organizational conditions such as group structure (task 
structure, group composition), organizational support and 
reinforcement (including reward systems, educational systems 
and information systems) and expert coaching and process 
assistance to maximize effort, commitment, knowledge and 
skills. Effective groups require organizational support. 
Groups (not individuals) should be provided with reward 
systems as performance incentives, educational systems such as 
professional and interpersonal team training and adequate 
information systems to collect and process information 
essential to task assignment. They should also be provided 
with enough material resources such as equipment and space to 
accomplish their goals. 
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2. Task Cohesiveness and Commitment. 
The specificity of group goals and accuracy of 
performance feedback have been found to increase work group 
cohesiveness. Also, cohesiveness has been positively linked 
to performance. Cohesiveness that is based on how attractive 
the task is to group members can lead to improved commitment 
to group goals, coordination through common understanding and 
levels of participation in the group process. The size of the 
group can also affect the group's effectiveness. O'Reilley 
and Roberts (1977) examined the effectiveness of 43 small to 
medium-sized groups with between three and 53 members. They 
concluded that: 
as groups size increased, the possibility for group 
connectedness decreased because of limitations on the 
amount of effort that an individual can spend 
interacting with an increasing number of others. 
(p.677) 
Groups should be small enough to facilitate interaction among 
its members but contain a sufficient number of members to 
ensure all interested parties are represented. Groups should 
include members who possess adequate task and interpersonal 
skills and contain a good mix of individuals who are "neither 
so similar to one another that they are like peas in a pod nor 
so different that they have trouble working together." [Ref 
19:p.499] 
As well as group size, organizational integration is 
also an important factor in a group's potential for success. 
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The higher degree of required external integration, the more 
group effectiveness depends on the pace, productivity and 
workload of others. If the pace of outsiders is good, group 
effectiveness can be positively influenced. But if it is 
poor, a group's progress and reputation can suffer through no 
fault of their own. 
Hackman idem:ifies five common mistakes or "Trip 
Wires" that cause group effectiveness to falter. They are: 
Designers of work groups call performing units a 
"team" but treat and manage members as 
individuals. 
Managers do not maintain an appropriate balance 
between authority maintained by them and authority 
given to the team. 
Management assembles a large group of people, 
tells them what is to be accomplished with only 
general details and lets the "work out the 
details." 
Managers specify challenging team objectives, but 
skimp on organizational support. 
Group designers assume that members already have 
all of the competence necessary to work well as a 
team. 
Maintaining a balance of authority may seem contradictory to 
the participative approach. Although exercising too many 
constraints on the teams can be counterproductive to their 
purpose, giving them too much authority or too little 
direction can also limit their effectiveness. [Ref 19:pp 493-
504] 
TRI CARE' s decision to use working groups to aid in the 
implementation of their immense organizational change has 
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----------------------------~----~----· 
proven to have some very positive effects on the organization. 
The remainder of this thesis will contain an analysis of data 
collected during interviews with members of the TRICARE 
Project Office and numerous members of TRICARE' s working 
groups. Conclusions and recommendations will then be outlined 
based on the results of the interviews and the analysis. 
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V. DATA »IALYSIS 
A. IN'l'RODtJCTIOR. 
In February 1993, five Federal Working Groups (FWG's) were 
officially chartered by the TRICAR.E Coounanders' Board to 
facilitate horizontal conmunication and encourage cooperation 
between the military services and the Veterans' Administration 
(VA). The principal objective of this program was to maximize 
the use of federal healthcare resources through sharing 
between the VA and DOD. The VA was included in TRICAR.B 
Federal Working Groups in support of the DOD Health Resources 
Sharing and Emergency Operations act of 1982 (10 U.S. Code 
1104) and because they provide another resource with which to 
share, and offer new ideas. Cooperative efforts between the 
DOD and VA can significantly contribute to improving the 
provision of healthcare in support of TRICAR.E' s goals of 
improved access, quality and cost containment. 
To date, TRICARE has formed five working groups. They 
include the Laboratory, Pharmacy, Shared Procurement, 
Information Systems, and Staff Development groups. To ensure 
group and individual anonymity, they will be referred to as 
Teams Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta and Echo (not in respective 
order). Both men and women from these groups were interviewed 
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as part of the research, but all individuals will be referred 
to as "he" in an attempt to ensure anonymity on the part of 
the interviewees. 
The FWG's are comprised of various representatives from 
the different medical facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
administrative offices and the VA) and are tasked with 
investigating specific issues to improve the provision of 
healthcare under the new TRICARE organization. In February 
1993, five FWG's were officially chartered, and the groups 
were asked by che Commanders' Board to formalize their 
mission/efforts. At that time, the Commanders approved the 
respective mission statements and memberships in an attempt to 
empower the groups and their members. One Project Office 
administrator explained that the TRI CARE Commanders' Board and 
Project Office Staff wanted: 
everyone to be able to work through problems on their own. 
We oversee what they are doing, but if anyone knows how to 
make good changes at the working level, it's the workers. 
We don't want to make changes that we think will make 
their jobs easier, because we don't really know what they 
do day to day. They know how to make the process easier 
because they work the process. They know how to better 
work together because they're the ones working together. 
That's what we're about ...• You can order people to do 
anything you want, but it's better if they own it, it's 
better if they understand it and can incorporate it into 
their daily lives. You can't force people to do those 
kind of things. 
Although the Federal Working Groups were only officially 
chartered in February, 1993, the idea of using working groups 
began in Tidewater approximately two years earlier. 
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The three hospital conunanders originally began meeting 
together in about 1988 to talk about ways they could help each 
other solve conunon problems. They did not get too involved in 
sharing or contracting, it was just exchanging information and 
talking. They discussed the idea of getting groups of people 
from each facility together to meet and talk about how they 
could better use their collective resources and share 
information and ideas to work more efficiently. It was from 
those discussions that the tri- service working groups were 
established. 
1. Team Alpha. 
Team Alpha was the first group to be formed. Members 
were comprised of the heads of Alpha Department in the various 
medical facilities. Group members first began meeting because 
they felt that savings and improvements could be realized from 
such a venture and could easily be evaluated through material 
measures such as dollar savings, less material waste, 
equipment utilization, etc. They have been meeting for 
approximately two and one half years. 
2 . Team Bravo. 
Team Bravo was the second group to form and was formed 
shortly after Team Alpha. Members of this group were 
comprised of the heads of Bravo Department. Like Team Alpha, 
this group got started because of expected cost savings as a 
result of the departments working together. Both Team Alpha 
and Bravo were formed prior to TRICARE's implementation. One 
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group member of Team Bravo conveyed his recollection of the 
roots of his group: 
(We started meeting) about two and a half years ago. (I)t 
was decided by the directors of the hospitals that it was 
necessary for all the Chiefs of Services to get together 
and identify opportunities to save money and share 
resources. 
The Chiefs of the Alpha and Bravo services were contacted and 
each tasked to meet in a working group. 
3. Team Charlie. 
Team Charlie was formed and met for the first time in 
January 1993. This group was established to provide a means 
for the various facilities to share specific non-material 
resources. Since resources in this group are non-material, 
evaluating group "success and effectiveness" is not as easy as 
measuring cost savings or waste reduction. During their first 
meeting group members introduced themselves to each other and 
discussed what they all did during their regular workday. 
They then proceeded to brainstorm ideas for topics they wanted 
their working group to address. They planned to prioritize 
the list at their next meeting and discuss each item further. 
Their next meeting was cancelled due to inclement weather, and 
each meeting since has been cancelled because a quorum could 
not be reached (due to apparent lack of interest on the part 
of one or some group members). 
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4. Team Delta. 
Team Delta has been meeting for approximately two 
years. These group members began meeting because of the 
anticipated cost savings that they thought could be realized 
by consolidating the efforts of the multiple facilities. They 
have several issues they are working on that they believe will 
result in cost savings, however, a high turnover rate in the 
group has detracted from the group's effectiveness. 
5. Team Echo. 
Team Echo has been meeting for approximately one year. 
This group's goal is to improve efficiency and facilitate 
communication and the easy exchange/sharing of information 
between agencies (DOD and VA). Like Team Charlie, measuring 
this group's effectiveness {efficiency} is not as easy as 
using material measures (dollars, cost per unit, etc.). Poor 
attendance at initial meetings has slowed this group's 
progress. 
1. Group Membership Criteria. 
All five working groups were formed from similar 
departments within the M'l'F' s, clinics and the VA. For 
example, the Information Systems Working Group is comprised of 
representatives from each information systems department, 
Shared Procurement members are from the logistics/materiel 
management service, etc. Individuals from the VA became 
involved in the groups in support of the VA and DOD Health 
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Resources Sharing and Emergency Operations Act. Each medical 
facility has at least one member permanently assigned to the 
group with some facilities having more than one. Membership 
selection for these groups was based solely on the 
individual's position in the organization. This approach was 
selected because administrators wanted the groups to be 
comprised only of individuals who had decision making 
authority. They did not want group members to be concerned 
with whether their boss would agree with recommendations or 
with members having to ask their boss for permission to do 
anything. 
2. Group Missions. 
Members of the working groups were tasked by the 
hospital commanders to discuss ways to overcome problems that 
would keep them from being able to work collectively and 
cooperatively. One member recalls their first meeting: 
At our first meeting we had a brainstorm session to 
see what types of problems we would have to solve if 
we were going to be able to cooperate and work 
together. 
To be able to effectively work together as a team, members at 
the different medical facilities felt that they had several 
hurdles to overcome. These hurdles include: 
1. Geographic separation, 
2. Being able to increase departmental/divisional 
efficiency without an associated increase in 
resources and (do more with less) , 
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3. Overcoming the habitual single~service mindset and 
traditional ways of doing business. 
All working group efforts address concerns in these three 
basic areas . Group efforts have all been directed toward 
clearing these obstacles. 
B. PWG's - WHAT'S WOUDIG 
During the course of this research, several positive 
issues surfaced as a result of working group efforts that have 
significantly contributed to the success of TRICARE. They 
are: 
1. Many group members feel that as a group they are 
working well together and are proposing good ideas 
to the Commanders• Board that will help them work jointly. 
2. Several working groups have come up with proposals 
that they feel will help bridge the geographic 
miles between them. 
3. Working groups have found (and implemented) ways 
to break tradition, coordinate their efforts, 
better utilize their collective resources and save 
money. 
4. Use of the working groups has increased horizontal 
communication among the various agencies. 
5. Group efforts are assisting the DOD and VA in 
finding ways to better share their collective 
resources. 
All of these issues assist in breaking down the barriers 
mentioned in the previous section and will be addressed one at 
a time. 
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1. Working Well Together. 
Teams Alpha and Bravo had great success coming up with 
ideas and suggestions to overcome the aforementioned barriers 
of geographic separation, efficiency, and communication. 
Their relatively quick success began with their very first 
meeting. The relative ease with which these groups began was 
a key factor in their motivation and feelings of success. 
During interviews, members of these groups all mentioned that 
they had no trouble getting started. From the first meeting, 
group members all got along and ideas for discussion topics 
came very easily. Some group members recalled having positive 
feelings about the first few meetings of their respective 
groups: 
Things took off very quickly, we were glad to meet. We 
would meet at the different facilities, not in the same 
place all the time. we would have lunch meetings at the 
different Officers' Clubs, too. The group meshed quickly 
and worked well together. 
(We had) a brief on TRICARE and how it was going to work. 
Then we had a brainstorming session to see what issues we 
needed to discuss. No one was shy, and we all had some 
good ideas. The joint purchasing idea came up first, then 
the reference testing - the civilian lab services - , and 
the workload sharing came f ram that. Then all of that led 
to the transportation issue. If we were going to share 
work and resources, we had to have a way to get it back 
and forth. I think we all left that first meeting feeling 
like we had some good ideas to work with and something 
that was going to help us work together. 
For one group, by meeting at lunchtime, not just in meeting 
rooms, it became an enjoyable experience, not just work. 
Every member of Teams Alpha and Bravo that was interviewed had 
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the same opinion. They have been busy at every meeting, have 
had many excellent ideas and have already sent proposals and 
recommendations to the Commanders' Board for consideration. 
When asked why they thought they had "instant success" as a 
group while some others were having difficulty, the 
predominant opinion was that they initially got together just 
to talk about things. They were already meeting when the 
TRICARE Commanders' Board directed the FWG's to meet. One 
individual explains this feeling: 
We were asked to meet and see what we could do. We, I 
guess I shouldn't speak for everyone, I didn't feel like 
anyone was making me do anything. We were doing it for 
ourselves. We weren' t forced to look at anything in 
particular. I guess it was just not a lot of pressure or 
coercion on us. I could see that this could really help 
me out so I had a personal interest in it. 
Team members believe that when they started meeting there was 
no "corporate pressure" to get specific issues resolved. They 
were just out to look for issues that could help them share 
and work together more easily. They were meeting to see what 
they could do for then~elves and for each other, not to see 
what they could do for TRICARE. One member from Team Bravo 
felt that since everyone wanted to accomplish the same thing 
(share services/resources), they all had the same vision for 
the direction of the group. There was no dissention among the 
ranks as far as what to discuss. 
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Well, it started out as "How can we share services with 
each other?" At one of our first meetings, we discussed 
(how) to share resources and services .... 
One Team Alpha member agreed. He thought they meshed easily 
because "everyone came together with the same idea. The key 
thing for all of us was sharing resources." Also, since the 
groups' main focus was centered on the department that group 
members were in charge of, they all had a personal interest in 
increasing efficiency and saving money. In addition, 
improvement within each department could be easily measured in 
much the same way (dollars, materials, reduced waste, etc.). 
The units they dealt with were the same and could be 
materially measured using numbers and dollar figures. For 
example, when the laboratories had more tests than they had 
the capacity to complete, they would send lab samples to 
civilian test facilities for processing. By sharing 
laboratory facilities, many members stated that they have not 
had to use civilian facilities as much, thus s~ving money for 
the hospital or clinic. One individual in the Laboratory 
group, when asked if the group's efforts had Incc~e his job any 
easier, he said that it wasn't easier except that "some tests 
that they do for us now at the VA we don't have to send to the 
reference labs" anymore. This equates to real dollar savings 
- a material measure of success that is easily seen and 
recognized by everyone. It is something of which group 
members can be (and are) proud. 
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One member of the Laboratory group feels very 
successful because his boss has noted an increase in their 
service's efficiency. 
(My boss) has no problem with me being on the team. As a 
matter of fact, we're getting more tests done at no more 
cost and that looks good for all of us. It's really made 
the workload easier because we're sending tests to 
Hospital A (that we would normally send out to have done) . 
Before establishment of the working groups, hospitals and 
clinics did not share testing fa ilities or do much of 
anything for each other. If tests couldn't be done in house, 
they would be sent out to a civilian reference lab for 
processing. Now, as a result of the cooperative spirit 
brought on by the working groups, individuals are more 
inclined to share their collective resources. 
Another group member felt a great feeling of 
satisfaction not with any material measure of success, but 
simply because the Commanders' Board liked his group's ideas 
and suggestions. When asked when he remembered feeling most 
satisfied after a meeting he said: 
I don't remember the date or anything, but it was when we 
had come to a point when we made our first recommendation 
to the Commanders' Board. I remember when we found out 
that he liked it we were really excited - I was really 
excited. I really felt that all of our work and time was 
worth it, that the Commander really liked our 
recommendation. 
Motivation for this member was brought on by the recognition 
of superiors of the efforts of himself and his group. This 
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recognition can be just as important as success brought on by 
measured improvement. 
One member of the Pharmacy group conveyed an obvious 
feeling of satisfaction that the collective pharmacies had a 
noticeable decrease in wasted materials. This happened 
because the different hospitals began sharing with each other 
(instead of throwing away) things they could no longer use. 
Since drugs have a limited shelf life, when they expire they 
have to be thrown away. The Pharmacy group now shares drugs 
with each other that are coming close to their expiration 
date. The head of one of the pharmacies explains how they 
have saved money by reducing waste: 
(We identify) short dated drugs and share them instead of 
throwing them away. We circulate a list now of short 
dated drugs (that are ready to expire) and if anyone wants 
them they can come pick them up instead of us throwing 
them away. It works the same at the other places. 
There's no charge for this, it just cuts down on waste. 
I think it's saved the four hospitals around $100,000 per 
year. Not each hospital, but in total. 
In the past, these materials would be disposed of when they 
expired. By participating in the working groups, members are 
becoming more cooperative and willing to share with each 
other. These real time, easily seen and understood measures 
of success have helped the teams see progress, stay motivated 
and continue to meet, work and improve operations. 
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2. Geographic Separation. 
Dealing with the extensive geographical distance between 
the facilities is a main concern of hospital and TRICARE 
personnel and is one of the problems that the FWG's set out to 
solve. Traditionally, if one of the medical facilities needed 
to get patients or goods from one hospital/clinic to another, 
they would send a courier themselves or run a shuttle. All of 
the groups decided that if they were going to share resources, 
they needed an easier way to get materials back and forth. 
One specific idea the groups came up with to bridge this 
distance is to contract a civilian transportation/courier 
service that would link the three hospitals, all of the 
clinics and the VA together. This service would allow the 
facilities to seem less geographically separated and better 
able them to transport patients or material goods (X-Rays, lab 
samples, paperwork, drugs, etc.} they needed to share. One 
individual on Team Bravo conveyed the birth of the idea: 
we came up with four (ideas) that we have been working on. 
The first is a transportation service. If we are going to 
cooperate, we need to have a transportation service 
between the hospitals and clinics. . . When we first 
thought of it, we wanted a courier service for (our 
department} only. Then as discussion developed, it was a 
better idea to share the service with others . . . for 
paperwork, patients, whoever needs to use it. . If we 
were going to share work and resources, we had to have a 
way to get it back and forth. 
It is quite interesting to note in this interview excerpt that 
at first, even as a group, they were only looking out for 
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their own interests. They wanted the service only for their 
group to use. After talking it over, they decided that there 
was more sharing to be done among the facilities than just 
among themselves, so they then decided to involve other 
departments in the proposal. They knew it would take longer 
to offer participation to other departments, but they felc 
that it was the best thing for TRICARE as a whole. Not only 
have they changed their traditional mindset to work with each 
other as a group, the groups are also starting consider the 
needs of other groups and see the big picture of the tri-
service cooperative effort. 
This transportation service has many expected benefits to 
TRICARE. Sharing among the services and the VA involves more 
than simple talking during working group meetings. It 
involves the sharing and exchange of actual goods and services 
that will increase the overall efficiency of the Tidewater 
area healthcare system. If laboratories are to use their 
collective resources to get the most done at the least cost, 
it seems logical to have an easy way to get test samples from 
place to place. If the pharmacies are to 8hare short-dated 
drugs, they need a way to be transported also. Also, since 
the DOD and VA do not share a common information system, a 
transportation service could also be used to transport copies 
of contracts, and other information that needs to be shared. 
One way to get items back and forth would be for each facility 
to drive items to the various hospitals themselves. This is 
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both time consuming and a great duplication of effort. It 
also wastes time out of a productive workday because it takes 
people away from their regular jobs to make deliveries and 
pick-ups. Having a courier service would simplify the sharing 
process while leaving hospital employees to work a full day. 
Other benefits of the transportation service include sending 
patient records, X-Rays, etc., to different facilities for 
consult/second opinion, or sending copies of procurement 
cor..tracts, proposals, MOU's, etc. for review by other agency 
departments. 
One group member was more than willing to look into 
details including prices for contracting a civilian courier 
service. He quickly volunteered his services to the group: 
I told them at one meeting that I would contact some 
professional courier services for prices. It would 
include all of the (hospitals and) satellite clinics. 
Once I brought that information back, we put it 
together and sent it up to the Cormnanders' Board as a 
recommendation with all of the figures for setting it 
up. 
This was one groups' initial success with having a 
recommendation accepted by the Cormnanders' Board for further 
consideration. 
This is considered by all of the groups to be a critical 
element in allowing considerable sharing to be done among the 
services and the VA. Evidence of this is that other groups 
were also discussing the same issue at their meetings. Many 
group members emphasized the importance of the transportation 
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issue during their interview and expressed that it was a 
critical component of their sharing effort. Once the proposal 
was made, the issue was given to the Project Office for 
further research and implementation. Group members are now 
waiting for a survey to be completed and a contract to be 
awarded. They are anxiously awaiting the final implementation 
of this proposal. 
3. Breaking Tradition. 
Use of the working groups has helped members break the 
traditional "every man for himself" mindset between the 
military services and the VA. Each hospital has traditionally 
been run by its respective service and asking for or providing 
assistance to another agency wasn't standard operating 
procedure. One individual recalls how he (and each agency) 
normally kept to themselves: 
Before this, the Navy was here, the Army was here, the 
Air Force was here and everyone lived in their own 
little world. Before this, I didn't even know the 
people at the other (hospitals) and they didn't know 
me. 
Changing people's thinking from the traditional single-service 
way of doing things to having a more joint, cooperative effort 
is one example of how working groups have been successful. 
Three examples of groups finding ways to break tradition, 
coordinate their efforts and better utilize their collective 
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resources are creating an ad hoc transportation service, 
combining buying power and eliminating duplication of effort. 
a. Transportation Service. 
One example of the positive influence of working 
groups in breaking tradition is an ad hoc transportation 
service that was created and is currently being used by one of 
the groups. Before any "official proposal" was ma.de to the 
Conunanders' Board requesting to contract a civilian courier 
service (described in the previous section), the members of 
one team, in the interim, tried to work something out and set 
up a temporary courier service among themselves. 
One of the hospitals had been running a shuttle to 
transport patients from their hospital to others long before 
the joint courier venture was even thought of. In the spirit 
of true cooperation, he offered the service to other members 
of his group to transport the items they were trying to share. 
Although thjs cooperative service was only meant to be 
temporary, it is providing a vehicle to get lab samples, 
paperwork, pharmaceuticals, patients, etc., back and forth 
between the different hospitals and clinics. This individual 
explains his proposal: 
My hospital and lab are small so we asked 
Hospital A if they could do some tests for us. My 
hospital has been transporting patients . for 
follow up on things we just can't do here. I had been 
using our Patient Transport to shuttle test stuff (of 
mine) to the different hospitals. So at one of the 
meetings after we discussed needing a shuttle service, 
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I offered the service I was using to everyone. The 
van goes to the (different hospitals} and picks things 
up. 
Prior to this member's involvement in the working 
group, he had a shuttle service that only his hospital used. 
Until he became involved in the working group, he hadn't 
offered its use to anyone else. His involvement in the 
working group has changed his way of thinking from a single 
service view and has provided the catalyst needed to inspire 
multi-service cooperation. Group members are already seeing 
the benefits of being able to transport items back and forth. 
As discussed in the previous section, short-dated 
pharmaceuticals are being shared as well as lab samples being 
transported for testing at other facilities. These 
arrangements have resulted in real cost savings and increased 
efficiency. 
b. Group Purchasing. 
The traditional means by which each facility 
purchases supplies and services has also changed as a result 
of working group efforts. Different groups (not just the 
shared procurement group} have begun to coordinate their 
efforts to get better prices in the open market. As any 
consumer knows, most merchants give discounts for volume 
purchases. So, if one hospital can get a discount for buying 
in bulk, wouldn't a bigger discount result from four hospitals 
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purchasing together? This is the working groups' philosophy 
of combining procurement actions among the various agencies. 
Most of the groups have found ways to save money by combining 
their buying power. 
One example is the Laboratory group's efforts to 
combine their contracts with civilian laboratory testing 
facilities. Currently, all of the laboratories are paying 
different prices for the same tests because each facility's 
contracted volume is different - price per test varies with 
volume. Group members decided that since everyone contracted 
at least a portion of their lab tests out of house, they could 
all get the maximum discount if they acted as one purchaser. 
One group member explains the idea: 
Well, no way do we have enough resources to do all of 
the tests that need done in-house, so we contract with 
civilian labs to do some of them. Just like buying 
supplies in bulk, we want to contract in bulk too. 
Right now we are all paying different amounts for the 
same tests because we all have different quantities 
that we contract for. We' re looking at working volume 
discounts for all lab work for everyone. 
This innovative way to contract is definitely a new way of 
doing business for all involved. The same tests are being 
done as before, but the group's willingness to work together 
and cooperate are getting them done for less money. Although 
nothing really stopped them from working together like this 
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before, everyone was simply used to only working within their 
own facility. Establishment of the working groups has changed 
that mindset. 
This same basic idea is being used for buying 
supplies in bulk. One group invited one of their common 
supply vendors to a meeting to discuss the possibility of the 
four facilities having consolidated purchasing power. One 
group member recalled how this happened and how popular he 
thought the idea would be: 
(Another idea) is using the idea of combined buying 
power - buying in bulk, volume discounts for supplies. 
We have actually gotten one of our vendors to work 
with the hospitals as one customer instead of three or 
four. This is a really popular idea because it 
equates to real dollar savings that everyone can see. 
They first had to check with their contracting office to 
ensure that no violation of the Competition in Contracting Act 
(CICA) would result. They were given a green light to have a 
meeting. Another group member was very relieved (and a little 
surprised) that there were no "stupid rules why they couldn't 
do it." He explains: 
We're having a vendor come to one of our meetings to 
get their input on the ideas of volume buying for the 
four of us. I had to check to make sure that it 
didn't violate some type of contracting rules, but 
it's one of our current vendors, so we're OK. 
Another group met with a different vendor to see if they could 
get a discount price from the vendor for a guaranteed volume. 
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The facilities wanted to set up one Blanket Purchase Agreement 
(BPA) for certain supplies they all used. A BPA is a contract 
for a specific dollar amount and is usually used for 
consumable, low priced or limited shelf life items. The 
contract is awarded once for an exact dollar amount, and items 
are ordered from the vendor throughout the fiscal year until 
all of the funds are exhausted. The benefits of this are 
many. If supplies are ordered frequently from the same 
vendor, a new contract does not need to be written for each 
order. Once the BPA is awarded, it eliminates administrative 
lead time and paperwork for each subsequent supply order. A 
benefit to the vendor is that they can count on a fairly 
certain dollar amount of business throughout the year from the 
customer with which they have the BPA. In the working group's 
case, the vendor they are working with is more than willing to 
lower prices in exchange for a combined BPA. The group is now 
sort:_ 19 out the financial and paperwork details of the 
agreement with each facility's financial departments. 
Although there are special financial and group 
contracting considerations with these issues that group member 
cannot complete themselves, they demonstrates that if given 
the opportunity, independent and traditionally non- related 
organizations can and will (or will find ways to) break 
traditional barriers to benefit from collective efforts and 
ideas. The working groups' mission to "coordinate sharing" is 
clearly demonstrated by these particular efforts. 
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c. Resource Utilization. 
Working groups have come up with some innovative, 
very non-traditional ways to share their resources and 
increase efficiency. These include workload sharing, and 
eliminating duplications of effort. The idea of workload 
sharing is for each facility to share any excess capacity they 
may have with others who have overflows. This excess capacity 
can include testing, drawing blood, training, transportation, 
etc. It can be anything the facilities want and are willing 
to share. Duplication of effort involves different 
facilities purchasing the same equipment, doing the same work, 
etc. 
Workload sharing is one way the labs are helping 
each other get more tests done within the military facilities. 
If more tests can be done within the MTF's, less money has to 
be spent sending the excess to civilian labs for processing. 
Sharing in this area has already begun among the facilities. 
Each hospital currently shares its testing facilities with the 
others. Although some hospitals are large while others are 
small with more limited resources, sharing between the 
military departments is done mostly on the basis of need and 
ability. The focus is on one service or good in exchange for 
another; the dollar amounts are not important. Interviews 
with working group members portray this cooperative spirit: 
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To save money we try to share services without 
actually having money changing hands. . With 
Hospital B and Hospital C, as long as we're helping 
out in some way, doing what we can, they consider that 
fair and equal payment. 
Well, if I can do something for Hospital A and they 
can do something for me to help out, we don't care 
whose service costs more. To us it's an even trade. 
I don't really send anything to Hospital B, but I'm 
not going to say they can't use (anything of ours) if 
I don't get anything from them. It is in my best 
interest to cooperate with them whether I get anything 
from them or not. Hospital A does a significant 
amount of lab tests for the rest of us because they 
are bigger. We just do what we can. 
This workload sharing also goes beyond sharing the same kind 
of service (e.g., lab tests). If one facility has excess 
testing capacity and another has excess training capacity, 
those types of services are also being shared. This is done 
because the smaller hospitals do not have as many resources 
with which to share, so the groups are becoming creative. For 
example, two of the laboratories are relatively small compared 
to the third. If one facility doesn't have enough testing 
capacity to share, they are sharing other things. To balance 
the sharing scales, blood drives are now being conducted in 
exchange for lab tests. Another service that is shared is 
training for technicians in the hospitals. Two group members 
explained the sharing arrangements that have been discussed 
within their respective groups: 
I see our group as a cooperative effort between the 
three services and the VA. It can be sharing 
resources, getting better prices on buying goods and 
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services that we all use and also in education. For 
example, Hospital A says they will be getting a lot 
rl' ore technicians and need places to train them. Well, 
their folks can train with us and if we need it our 
folks can train with them. We save money and get 
education and training we need. 
Someone from Hospital A brought up the idea that since 
Hospital C doesn't have a really big lab to trade 
testing with, they can do something else. In return 
for one doing tests in the lab, the other has a really 
good training program for lab techs. Hospital C lets 
techs go through their training program in return for 
(having) lab tests (done) . Again, no exchange of 
money, just goods for services. 
There was no reason in the past why these types of 
arrangements could not be made. There were no legal, ethical 
or medical reasons why sharing of resources (personnel, 
materiel, material, etc.) could not have been done in the 
past. The only reasons that existed include parochialism, 
habit and the idea of "this is the way we've always done it." 
Use of the working groups to get personnel from the different 
services and the VA together to work out arrangements like 
these on their own has led to a more cooperative, coordinated, 
efficient way to provide healthcare to DOD and VA bene-
ficiaries in the Tidewater area. 
Duplication of effort and duplication of costs 
occur when two or more facilities provide the same service, 
conduct the same tests, and purchase the same equipment and 
supplies on different contracts. Efficiency can often be 
improved and costs lowered if one facility becomes the main 
provider of a particular service, or multiple contracts are 
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combined and awarded only once. This is precisely what the 
working groups are trying to accomplish. One idea that the 
Laboratory group thought of is to establish different 
hospitals as "primary test sites" for certain lab tests. One 
laboratory group member remembered how the idea came from one 
of the working group's first meetings: 
With (four different hospitals) and all the clinics 
doing "X" type of tests, we probablv don't all have to 
do all of the tests and duplicate efforts. What we 
talked about was all test "A" going one place and all 
test "B" getting done somewhere else. 
Although this idea has not been implemented to date, the group 
is researching the possibilities of such an arrangement. This 
idea, however, would require the use of some type of 
transportation service to get all the tests to the primary 
test site. A transportation service was discussed earlier in 
this chapter and has been referred to the Project Office for 
implementation. 
A few of the groups, especially the Shared 
Procurement group are looking at reducing or even eliminating 
duplicate procurement actions. One group is working with a 
vendor who has agreed to treat TRICARE as one customer and 
off er pricing based on total sales volume instead of 
individual hospital purchases. Group members have found it 
time consuming and frustrating figuring out for the first time 
how to have a contract prepared for an arrangement like this, 
but they feel once it is figured out, it will get easier with 
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each successive try. One group member explains both the 
frustration and hope: 
We've managed to get one of our common vendors to 
treat the four of us like one agent. Now the whole 
issue is getting caught up in the finance offices. I 
guess it's because we're all not used to doing things 
like this. Money needs to be transferred here and 
there, and now the VA's involved and we all do things 
differently. But once it gets worked out and it's 
done once, it will get easier and easier the next time 
and the next. Once we start a new habit of doing 
contracts this way, it will seem more normal. 
This group member understands that there may be some obstacles 
that need to be hurdled to change the way they traditionally 
do business. He also understands that once these problems are 
tackled, the evolution becomes easier as new ways to do 
business emerge. Consolidation and cooperation can then 
become the norm and instead of the exception. 
Another group has also gotten a current vendor to 
off er substantially better discounts based on a common BPA 
contract that includes all services and the VA. Funding 
information will come from each individual agency, but 
duplicate procurement contracts will be eliminated. This not 
only reduces paperwork and total contract preparation time, it 
also reduces cost because better discounts are being offered 
by vendors based on a larger volume of sales. 
4. Horizontal Communication. 
Use of the working groups has resulted in an increase 
in lateral or horizontal communication among the different 
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agencies. In the past, each hospital was an independent 
facility. People in each hospital/clinic had little dealings 
with those in a different se:cvice. Navy hospital and Navy 
clinic personnel talked to each other because they were in the 
same se:cvice, but Navy hospital and Army hospital personnel, 
for example, did not. Several individuals expressed this 
traditional mindset during inte:cviews. When asked if they 
ever worked with anyone in their group from the other 
facilities before, most individuals said no. Responses like 
"no, I never had any reason to," or "no, before everyone just 
did their own thing" were common. Now that individuals have 
been working together in the working groups, they communicate 
with each other much more often. 
When asked what cornr-.'1nication was like before TRICARE 
and how it has changed as a result of their participation in 
the working groups, some group members said: 
Before this, the Navy was here, the Army was here, the 
Air Force was here and everyone lived in their own 
little world. This has opened up the lines of 
communication because everyone knows each other now 
and feels free to call each other. Before then, I 
didn't even know the people at the other hospitals and 
they didn't know me. It's not that I wouldn't call 
anyone, but if you know people you're more likely to 
call. Just from working together, we can call each 
other now for advice, help. 
Before this I never contacted the VA for anything. 
Now we have meetings once a month plus I talk to them 
at least one other time. I talk to (the other 
hospitals} a lot more now because we're working 
together. 
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In addition, group members were asked to recall a time when 
they did call their colleagues in other services or facilities 
for help or advice. Some of the respondents recalled the 
following: 
I remember once I was reading a newsletter or a 
journal or something and I was looking at a new piece 
of equipment that (a vendor) was marketing. I didn't 
know much about the vendor, so I called (my colleague) 
from (one of the other hospitals) and asked if he knew 
anything about this company or the machine. I don't 
think he knew much more than I did, but the point is, 
I wouldn't have even called him before. Now that 
we've worked together I don't feel reluctant to call. 
I've called other group members to talk about an issue 
we're working on in the group and ended up asking them 
a professional question about procedures or tests or 
else answering the same kind of question about a 
conversation. I remember once I was talking to 
someone and we started talking about stuff we had 
heard at a conference a while back. I've made more 
professional contacts being in the group. I'm more 
likely to call any of them now since I know them. 
Most people won't call a stranger to ask them a 
question or advice. We're not strangers anymore. 
Calling colleagues to ask professional advice or get 
information on new medical procedures, equipment or standards 
is nothing new. What is new is the network of colleagues that 
is being developed in the Tidewater area as a result of 
individual participation in T"KICARE's FWG's. The 
communication links that have developed have crossed not only 
departmental lines, but hospital and service lines as well. 
This new horizontal dimension is a vital aspect of TRICARE's 
success. The goals of coordinating the delivery of healthcare 
among the Army, Navy, Air Force and the VA cannot be achieved 
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without establishing horizontal communication links. In this 
area, the FWG's have been very successful. 
S. Sharing Arrangements Between DOD and VA 
The VA and DOD have been coordinating their efforts in 
an attempt to provide better service to DOD and VA benefici-
aries. Of great initial concern to both TRICARE and the VA 
was the possible existence of legal reasons why they could not 
meet together, share resources and combine contracting 
actions. On 26 May 1993, one TRICARE administrator held a 
telephone conversation with Mr. John Casciotti, General 
Counsel for ASD(HA) to discuss resource sharing between the 
DOD and the VA. Mr. Casciotti stated unequivocally that no 
legal or contractual impediments to increased communications, 
resource sharing or involvement in TRICARE meetings exists. 
Therefore, the sharing of material, resources and support 
services are both legal and non-controversial. The only 
obstacles that did exist were the traditional roles each had 
in providing healthcare. It is the opinion of many group 
members interviewed that shared procurement issues are no more 
difficult with the addition of the VA. What has been 
difficult for the groups is sharing goods and services with no 
actual monetary reimbursement. 
Group members are becoming innovative in coming up 
with ideas to allow DOD and the VA to easily work together to 
share resources. One way they are promoting sharing is they 
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are writing sharing agreements or Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOU's). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the military 
services and the VA want to be able to share equally needed 
resources without the actual exchange of money. Transferring 
money from one service to another was viewed by one group 
member as being next to impossible. He said: 
We have had a problem, not really a big problem I 
guess, making sure that we didn't have to exchange any 
money. I don't know if you know, but it's almost 
impossible for two government agencies to give money 
to each other. I had no idea what the rules were. 
Swapping money between DOD agencies is just too hard. 
We can swap money with the VA, but we didn't want to. 
We wanted to set up some arrangement so we don't have 
to exchange money. 
The group members wanted to avoid the pain of having to 
prepare paperwork needed to reimburse another facility for 
services provided. This not only delays the process, but it 
also creates more work for someone else. They wanted this 
process to be as simple and painless as possible. The 
military services each agreed that they would share what they 
could share best and the value of the good or service would 
not be an issue. The VA, on the other hand, is under 
different budget controls and is quite concerned about the 
dollar value of services they provide compared to services 
they receive. To accommodate this difference in viewpoints, 
the military services are developing sharing agreements or 
MOU's with the VA. These MOU's allow the exchange of equal 
values of goods and services. Since this involved exchanging 
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individual goods and services for specific dollar amounts, the 
MOU is considered a contract. One group member explained why 
sharing agreements were being written: 
We are currently writing sharing agreements between each 
service and the VA to be able to share the labs. It's 
like a contract because the VA is trying to match (the 
sharing) dollar for dollar instead of service for service . 
. . . (W)e (the military) don't care whose service costs 
more. The VA wants each service to be worth the same 
money. I think it's because their budget constraints are 
tighter than ours. 
Unfortunately, the necessity to prepare a contract makes 
putting this idea into practice more complicated and take 
longer than simply shaking hands. Regardless of this delay, 
group members remain confident that once all of the paperwork 
has been sorted out, sharing among everyone will be greatly 
enhanced. To help speed the process along, one of the members 
from the VA brought a contracting representative to one of his 
group's meetings. Instead of taking questions back to the VA 
and the group having to wait for a response, the contracting 
representative was at the meeting readily available to ask and 
answer any questions related to the arrangement. It was 
decided that certain services would be specifically listed in 
the MOU with their associated dollar value. This document 
could be used to ensure that if an HIV test was done at the VA 
for one of the military hospitals, then equally valued goods 
or services would be received in return. Once this document 
is prepared, the VA will have an easy reference for and an 
94 
L___-----------------------------------······ .. 
easier time sharing their collective resources with the DOD 
facilities. 
This section has provided evidence that use of working 
groups can have positive effects on the implementation of 
change in an organization. TRICARE' s working groups have made 
many advances in changing the healthcare environment in the 
Tidewater area from a single service to a multi-agency effort. 
Unfortunately, with good there also comes bad. The next 
section will detail what obstacles still need to be cleared to 
allow TRICARE working groups to be more effective agents for 
change. 
C. PWG's - WHAT'S NOT WORltING 
During the course of this research, several issues 
surf aces that have caused the working groups to have 
difficulty achieving their goals. These issues are: 
1. Team members are getting frustrated because resolution of 
their issues is being delayed because of action required 
from others. 
2. High turnover rate of military group members has impaired 
group progress and effectiveness. 
3. Perceived lack of organizational importance of working 
group efforts and issues has impaired group member 
enthusiasm. 
4. The Managed Care/Coordinated Care Program is being viewed 
by some group members as simply another DOD program that, 
if given time, will be cancelled and replaced by 
something else. 
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These issues were conveyed during interviews by a majority of 
group members and will be addressed in this section one at a 
time. 
1. External Integ:.:ation. 
As outlined in Chapter IV, there are several factors that 
can promote or hinder group success. One of these is the 
degree to which a group depends on the actions of those 
outside their group. The higher the degree of required 
external integration, the more group effectiveness depends on 
the pace, productivity and workload of others. If the pace of 
outsiders is good, group effectiveness can be positively 
influenced. But if it is poor, a group's progress and 
reputation can suffer through no fault of their own. Several 
groups are currently waiting for action from people or 
departments outside their group for implementation/resolution 
of some of their issues and proposals. Groups are not only 
waiting for others to act, they are getting frustrated because 
they think the resolution/implementation process is taking too 
long. Three examples of frustration caused by outside 
integration surfaced during interviews. These examples 
involve the contracting of a transportation service, the 
preparing of shared procurement contracts and the writing of 
sharing agreements between the military services and the VA. 
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a. Transportation Service. 
The first example is the transportation issue 
discussed in the previous section. The transportation service 
is viewed by most all groups as an important element upon 
which sharing of most of their services and resources depends. 
For example, the pharmacies want to share short dated drugs, 
the laboratories want to share testing facilities, and 
contracts and other paperwork could be transported for the 
Information Systems, Shared Procurement and Staff Development 
groups. Implementation of this proposal has been taken out of 
the hands of the groups and taken by the Project Off ice for 
action. One group had researched the idea, contacted vendors 
for price quotes and made a proposal to the Commanders' Board. 
The Commanders' Board enthusiastically approved the idea and 
turned it over to the Project Office for further action. Once 
this happened, group members lost ownership of the idea and 
also lost track of its progress. One group member was asked 
if he knew the current status of the courier service proposal. 
He said: 
The Commander's Board liked the idea and from there it has 
gotten delayed because, because, I'm not really sure why. 
Surveys were sent out, but to the wrong people. 
When the idea was initially proposed and accepted, group 
members were very excited at the prospect of having one of 
their ideas implemented. They were seeing positive results of 
their efforts and felt like they were actually making a 
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difference. As time went on, however, enthusiasm dwindled as 
the issue seemed to get lost in the system. This group member 
has become disheartened with the handling of the proposal. He 
went on to say: 
If there's one thing that I could say negative against 
this whole procedure is that not everyone has the same 
urgency to get things done. This courier service that we 
all really need has taken forever. 
Someone (group members did not know who) was tasked to prepare 
and distribute a survey to determine what other departments 
would be interested in using a courier service if one was 
available. This is the point where group members began 
feeling frustrated. They felt that resolution/implementation 
of the transportation service was taking too long. Part of 
this frustration was due to lack of information. Group 
members did not seem to know the status of the issue and were 
very uncomfortable with their lack of knowledge. Group 
members did not resent the fact that tasking for completion of 
the project was given to someone else, they were unhappy 
because they did not know where the project stood. ThP.y were 
also unhappy that resolution depended on the action of someone 
else and they didn't know what the other person or 
department's priorities were. Another individual described 
the courier service issue as "winning the prize for getting 
lost in the bureaucracy the longest." When asked what his 
group's biggest obstacle was, he responded with: 
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I guess that would be when a decision requires a 
conunitment of resources out of our control. We all work 
wel 1 together doing what we can (among ourselves) and 
w~·re pretty successful when we don't have to go outside 
~he group. But when we have to go outside of the group 
for a decision or for resources, that'• when things get 
bogged down. Like the courier service. We think there's 
big savings to be realized if we can get a service going. 
We don't have the authority to conunit the resources and no 
one seems to be able to come up with the ability to do it. 
Administrators wanted to make sure that if a courier service 
was used, the most benefit would be received by everyone in 
the organization who was interested. This is why a survey was 
being distributed. One group member expressed his frustration 
with the survey process: 
Someone else was tasked to do the survey by the 
Conunanders' Board. I don' t even know who. They 
wanted to know who would be interested in using such 
a service, so they sent out a survey. They didn' t get 
a good response so they had to send out another one. 
I never even saw the first survey. I know 
they're working on it, but what's taking so long is 
beyond me. 
Q. When you say •they• are working on it, who is 
•they?• 
I have no idea. 
When asked if he was disappointed that someone else was doing 
the survey, this individual said no. He was disappointed, 
however, that things were not turning around as quickly as he 
had hoped or thought they should. Still another individual in 
another group expressed frustration, but no great surprise, 
that things were taking so long. He even seemed to expect it. 
During his interview he said: 
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... all that slows it down because now they're doing a 
survey to see who needs the service and how much they need 
it. It's slow but I don't think it's any slower than you 
expect. I just think that it takes time to see 
results because of the big organization that I mentioned 
earlier. 
This individual sees slow resolution of any issue within the 
military as the norm. He feels that the transportation 
service is an important issue for TRICARE and the sharing 
effort and would like to see it implemented as soon as 
possible. He does, however, expect delays and is not 
surprised by them. Another group member, who also feels that 
the transportation service issue is a key element in their 
collective sharing, thinks that it has been "a lot of work 
with no results." Group members also don't feel that they are 
being kept informed as to the status of the project. One 
member said "We don't even know what's going on anymore!" 
b. Shared Procurement Contracts. 
A second example of frustration caused by outside 
integration is the shared procurement contracts that are being 
prepared. Many of the groups are looking to get better prices 
from vendors by combining their buying power. The groups talk 
to the vendors, collect information regarding terms and 
pricing. Once they find a willing vendor, they have to send 
their ideas to the contract and/or finance offices for review, 
paperwork preparation and/or approval. This involvement of 
outside parties has caused considerable distress among group 
members. They have no objection to the contracting office 
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doing the contracting or the finance off ice doing the 
financing. What concerns them is the amount of time it is 
taking to get anything done. One group in particular is 
looking at combining contracts for providing oxygen for the 
home oxygen programs at the hospitals. The group has worked 
out the details with the vendor and is now waiting for 
financing issues to be resolved. One group member expressed 
concern with the length of the process: 
We've been working among ourselves to get everything 
agreed upon. Now we're just waiting for the finance 
offices to get things done. It's like a hurry up and 
wait. We work hard to get proposals in the works and 
then it seems like we wait for everyone else to get 
around to it so we can finish. 
It's not that group members do not want anyone outside their 
group involved in decision making. They do not like being 
"kept in the dark" on where their projects stand. The biggest 
frustration seems to be in the lack of information on the 
status of projects once they leave the group's internal 
control. Once issues are forwarded to other departments for 
action, group members don't think that fast enough turnaround 
is received or that they know what is causing delays. One 
group member stated that 
I know everyone's very busy and has a lot of work to 
do, but we'd like to know where it stands. I know 
this (home oxygen) issue is hung up with the finance 
people, but why I don't know. I can't imagine what 
can be taking so long. 
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This individual, as well as other group members, don't think 
for a minute that they can prepare contracts or that they know 
enough about financing procedures to do everything themselves. 
They do, however, question the time it has taken to resolve 
many of their issues. When possible, group members invite 
contracting or other personnel to their meetings to answer 
questions about the possibility or legality of some of their 
ideas. This provides immediate feedback when other parties 
outside the group are readily available at meetings. But when 
it comes to the actual preparing of paperwork (contracts, 
funds transfers, etc.) group members have to turn over control 
to someone else. It is the time it takes and reason for 
delays that is the issue, not the specific involvement of 
external parties. 
c. Sharing Agreements. 
Still another example of when groups have gotten 
impatient waiting on the actions of others outside their group 
is the sharing agreements (MOU' s) that are being written 
between the services and the VA. These sharing agreements are 
being prepared to allow the different hospitals and clinics to 
share laboratory facilities. Group members wanted to prepare 
a single sharing agreement to include all military facilities 
and the VA. Since the exact dollar value of services are 
specified in the agreement, the documents are being reviewed 
and approved by contracting personnel in the respective 
facilities. Group members found the idea of combining all 
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agreements into one to be a "contractual nightmare" and 
decided it would be easier for each facility to prepare their 
own MOU and list the equipment and services they wanted to 
share along with their respective prices. Each service was 
then responsible for coordinating their own MOU with the VA. 
One group member recalls the confusion that has been occurring 
during the preparation process as documents go from the VA 
contracts office to the military contracts office: 
We tried to set up one blanket agreement with everyone 
but it didn't work. (It was too complicated.) We had 
to do three separate agreements with Langley and the 
VA, Portsmouth and the VA and Ft. Eustis and the VA. 
It goes to the contracts people over here, and they 
didn't like the wording, so they sent it back {to the 
VA) and now they have it back here again. The VA 
specified prices for tests in the agreement, which is 
OK except they had other tests in there except for the 
lab tests {and the contracts people didn't like that}. 
This individual thought that the contracting people were being 
unnecessarily picky, but he also didn't know what exactly was 
involved in preparing a contract. He was speaking not from 
experience with contracts but f ram his perception of how 
things should work. Another group member finds the waiting 
game "irritating." He also feels that the group's progress 
and efficiency are being hampered because of having to wait 
for other people to act. During his interview, he explained 
his concern: 
I guess it's just irritating not knowing what's going 
on. We've been told to work together and see how we 
can work together. We've figured some things out, but 
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we can't do it because we don't have a piece of paper 
signed saying we can. The MOU's we're waiting on and 
the transportation business. It's taking forever. 
When you get too many hands in the pot nothing gets 
done. They're all good ideas, but sometimes I wonder 
it it's not just too much trouble - too much red tape 
involved. 
This individual feels frustrated that they were given a 
mission to see how they can work together and share resources. 
He feels that they have come up with some good ideas to allow 
that to happen but can't implement them because there is too 
much paperwork and too many other people involved. This is 
the "red tape" he is talking about - paperwork, contracting 
actions, and figuring out how joint payment is going to be 
made to name a few. He feels that his group has come up with 
good ideas to promote sharing but that they have been provided 
with no means to easily implement them. No one in the group 
is knowledgeable in the area of contracting or finance, so 
resolution of their issues must be put on hold while they are 
sent to one of these departments for review. 
When looking at the amount of external integration 
required by the working groups, most group members gave the 
impression that if the response they received from outside the 
group was faster or if they had been kept more informed on the 
status of actions, they wouldn't have felt so frustrated. 
Data collected during this research suggests that the 
departments of contracting and finance are the ones with which 
group members integrate and require additional action from the 
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most. If special ties and unique working relationships could 
be developed between the FWG' s and these two departments, 
resolution of working group issues could be done with less 
pain and frustration. From the external perspective, the 
contracting and finance departments have other things to do 
besides resolve working group issues. Other bills still must 
be paid and other contracts still processed. Special 
attention must also be paid to the additional workload created 
in these departments as a result of working group business. 
For example, because one group thought that coordinatir~g four 
contracting offices would be too difficult, each service is 
preparing their own sharing agreement with the VA. This 
equates to some duplication of effort in the contracting 
off ices in order to eliminate duplication of effort in the 
laboratories. What is saving time and money in one area is 
creating more work in another. 
2 • Bigh Turnover. 
Much of a group's success depends on how well group 
members work together and get along. When a member first 
joins an established group, one can expect that it takes a 
little time for the individual to "catch up" with what the 
group has been working on, getting to know other group 
members, understanding group norms, and learning how they work 
together. With this in mind, if group membership changes 
often, any wisdom gained from experience and the contributions 
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of departing members, unless fully understood by new members, 
can be lost forever. New members will need to be briefed on 
what the group is currently doing, what they have done and 
what they plan to do. This initiation process of new members 
can certainly slow the progress of groups like these that 
meet, at most, once a month. 
One group member feels that his group has had a 
difficult time getting things done because turnover in the 
group has been exceptionally high. Frequent changes in this 
group's membership have, in his opinion, been due to a high 
pe~centage of military members. In contrast, members of some 
of the other groups feel that one reason their groups have 
been successful is because they have had virtually the same 
group membership from the beginning. One particular group 
member felt that this particular point has contributed to the 
cohesiveness of his group since the same people can be counted 
on all the time. Group members all know each other, have 
learned to understand and trust each other and have become 
accustomed to the habits and personalities of other group 
members. They are all knowledgeable on current and pending 
issues, and new members don't need to be "trained" very of ten. 
He explains the positive results of having the same members: 
We've had the same committee for one year and no one 
has asked to be replaced by someone else. Everyone is 
very active and very excited. 
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He feels that having the same membership for a year has been 
a contributing factor to his group's effectiveness. 
Military members of a working group present a unique 
problem to group stability. While they may be the biggest 
contributors in a group, they are subject to frequent 
transfer. While civilians also transfer and are at times 
replaced by new members, they are not subject to transfer as 
frequently as military members. By the time a new military 
staff member reports to the command, becomes familiar with 
their job, familiar with the organization and familiar with 
the issues of the working group, a good percentage of their 
tour is over. Since it would not be practical to assign 
someone to a working group who is neither familiar with their 
job nor the organization in which they work, military members 
are not normally assigned to working groups immediately upon 
arrival. If military members don't get assigned to a group 
early in their tour, time becomes even more of a limiting 
factor. 
If a group has a low percentage of military members, 
productivity would only infrequently be interrupted when one 
of these members transfers. However, if a group has a very 
high percentage of military members, group progress would be 
interrupted extremely often as each member comes and goes at 
different times. This is a unique problem that one of the 
groups is facing. One member of this particular group feels 




things done. He blames this in part on frequent membership 
changes. He explains his frustration: 
We've been meeting for about two years and it seems 
like every few months someone's been replaced. It's 
not that people aren't enthusiastic or quit, in fact 
everyone comes to the group with real energy. The 
problem is military people transfer or they go to 
another job and someone else takes over for them at 
work and in the group. Each person contributes, but 
when you have someone new, you have to stop with each 
issue and catch them up. It really becomes a problem 
when you want to get anything done. Turnover is a 
really big problem. 
This individual has been a dedicated group member for the 
duration and feels that if he could add a bit of membership 
stability to his group, they could accomplish more and be more 
productive. 
As brainstorming takes place within the group, ideas 
are discussed and prioritized, and some ideas are chosen to 
act upon. This group has worked well together and initial 
problems with individual participation were quickly resolved. 
Members that have been assigned to the group have been 
enthusiastic and productive. Problems have occurred when 
members transfer and need to be replaced. This results in 
several detractors from group progress and effectiveness. 
First, new members need to be indoctrinated to group 
procedures, norms, expectations and briefed on current and 
planned action items. This takes time away from the group's 
productive activities. Secondly, any working relationships 
that have been developed with vendors or individuals in other 
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groups or departments become severed when that member 
transfers from the group. Action items that they have been 
researching have to be reassigned and new working rel~tion­
ships established. This effect of group membership is not 
unique to TRICARE' s FWG' s. Any group with a high rate of 
turnover would experience the same problems. What is unique 
in this case is the reason for the high turnover - military 
members. If the percentage of military members could be kept 
to a minimum or a required membership time (e.g. two year 
minimum membership) established, the negative effects could be 
minimized. 
3. Perceived Lack of Organizational Support. 
While some individuals are motivated by status, money 
and fame, others are motivated by recognition of a job well 
done, personal pride or a simple "thank you." The working 
groups work hard and want to be recognized for their efforts. 
They want the organization to recognize issues they consider 
to be important in carrying out the mission they were given by 
the TRICARE Commanders' Board. Many group members feel that 
since issues are taking so long to be resolved, they are not 
getting the organizational support they need to accomplish 
their mission. Group members not only feel that the 
organization does not support their efforts enough, they 
presented no evidence of any type of reward or recognition 
system for the working groups or its members. One of 
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Hackman' s enabling conditions that impacts group effectiveness 
is organizational support and reinforcement (including reward 
and educational systems} . Effective groups require 
organizational support. According to Hackman, in order for 
groups to achieve maximum effectiveness, groups (not 
individuals} should be provided with reward systems such as 
performance incentives, educational systems such as 
professional and interpersonal team 
coaching and process assistance 





No specific group reward systems are currently in 
place that provide FWG's or their members with the incentive 
to perform well. Members rely on their own feelings of 
satisfaction and achievement to intrinsically motivate 
themselves. Since no external rewards exist, groups members 
must also encourage each other. When they see the positive 
products of their own labor (cost savings, increased 
efficiency), they collectively feel good about the fact that 
they can really make a difference. If no immediate measures 
of success are readily apparent, group members have a 
difficult time seeing the benefits of their efforts without 
some other type of incentive. 
TRICARE also has no formal education and training 
system in place for the groups. Even though TRICARE doesn't 
have formal training available, one hospital has an active 
training schedule which has shown positive results. It is 
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available to anyone in the facility who is interested. The 
training that is offered helps people develop interpersonal 
skills and understand how groups function. This particular 
hospital has many working groups within the facility that deal 
with hospital specific issues. The training is available to 
individuals because that particular base commander endorses 
and encourages it. It is not specifically in support of 
TRICARE's FWG's. One individual from that hospital who has 
been through the training thinks it was extremely educational 
and helpful to their working group involvement. They 
explained how training was provided: 
The commander wants as many people as possible on the 
base to get to go to training. You go when you have 
the time and as many people go as possible. In the 
command here it is very positive for people to go to 
training because the commander endorses it. He even 
encourages it. I think it really helped me work on 
the group. I felt more comfortable and confident 
about what working in a group would be like. They 
also have a week long advanced course if you want to 
go. 
In this hospital, training was not only available, i.t was 
encouraged. It wasn't mandatory for anyone, but the perceived 
support from the hospital commander gave people the incentive 
to go. The commander's support of the training also gave 
supervisors more leniency in allowing people time off from 
their regular duties to go to training. This element of 
Hackman' s enabling conditions is missing in the TRICARE 
organization. Although there was no specific evidence 
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uncovered during this research that people who did not go to 
training have done poorly in the groups, those who were 
provided with training saw it as a positive influence on the 
quality of their participation. 
Group members also do not think that the organization 
places enough emphasis on the quick resolution of issues that 
working groups see as important. One group member explained 
what he thought the problem was: 
If there's one thing that I could say negative against 
this whole procedure is that not everyone has the same 
urgency to get things done. The courier service, that 
we all really need has taken forever, and the MOU has 
taken longer than it should. 
Issues such as the courier service and the writing of sharing 
agreements seem (to working group members) to pass through the 
organization with as little priority as routine business. This 
may in fact not be true, but this is the perception of working 
group members. Frustration is being caused, in part, by the 
lack of information group members have on the status of their 
projects. When group members don't know what is being done 
with an issue, they assume that nothing is being done. While 
this may far from the truth, hard feelings are often based on 
perception rather than fact. Subsection one of this section 
(External Integration) details all of the issues that working 
group members feel are not getting timely consideration. The 
detailed examples are the same in the two sections and don't 
need repeated. The issues involved, however, are quite 
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different. While the External Integration subsection deals 
with interaction with individuals outside the department, this 
issue deals mainly with perceptions of support (or lack of 
support) from the TRICARE administration (Project Office, 
Commanders' Board, etc.) For example, as one group was 
working on the transportation issue, they felt like they were 
making progress and doing a good job - making a difference. 
Once the issue was recommended to the TRICARE Commanders' 
Board, it was turned over to the Project Office for further 
action and implementation. From that point, group members 
stopped seeing steady progress toward actual implementation. 
The reasons why actions take so long are unknown to group 
members and may be very valid reasons from an organizational 
perspective. Since group members don't know the reason, they 
view it as or assume that it is because of lack of interest 
and support of management. This perception has detracted from 
group member enthusiasm. 
Another action, or lack of action, that has 
contributed to this perception is the chartering of groups and 
formal appointing of group members. Some groups had been 
meeting for over a year before the organization formally 
recognized them with official appointment letters for group 
members along with a written charter for the group. While 
group members were meeting to support the tri-service effort, 
they were not officially recognized by the organization. 
Prior to its members receiving appointment letters, one group 
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was having difficulty getting one of its members to attend 
meetings on a regular basis. When he was asked why his 
participation was so limited, he stated that he worked for the 
hospital commander, not for the TRICARE office. Not long 
after, this individual received an appointment letter, signed 
and sanctioned by the hospital commander, and his perspective 
quickly changed. Once he felt that the group's efforts were 
important to his ultimate superior, he was more willing to 
participate. The official charter and appointment letters 
also gave group members more of a feeling that the organi-
zation not only recognized their participation but that it 
also endorsed and supported it. 
4. Another DOD Program. 
Over the past several decades, the DOD has implemented 
many programs that after a few years were replaced by others. 
Some group members find it hard to dedicate a lot of their 
time to a program that they fear will become another one of 
DOD's "fly by night" programs. A few of the group members 
interviewed felt a great sense of responsibility to their 
regular "9-5" job and dedicated their time to working group 
efforts only when they "had the time." 
relayed his dilemma: 






to have faith in any of the military' s 
They change every time the administration 
I think a lot of things we do are good 
people are reluctant to put a lot of effort 
if they think it's just going to be 
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abandoned later. TRICARE, as far as I know, is just 
a test project. If (someone above us) doesn't like 
it, then we're just going to go back to the old way 
anyway. When Clinton goes, maybe the next guy won't 
care about healthcare as much. 
Many people have seen Anny, Navy and Air Force programs come 
and go and remember all of the (what they feel was) wasted 
time they spend. They are not being given a good feeling of 
permanence of the program. Group members need to be given a 
reason to believe that this program is not going to just go 
away like many other programs they have seen. 
Another group member, when asked why he thought some 
people were reluctant to enthusiastically participate in the 
groups and why some people didn't even come to the meetings. 
He said: 
The basic problem is that people's concern is not 
what's going on at another facility. Their job is to 
do their job and often it doesn't extend beyond that. 
All they see is the line outside their door, the stack 
of paperwork on their desk. They've got a lot of work 
to do. 
Group members, and probably many other hospital employees 
don't have a good macro view of the Coordinated Care Program 
or of TRICARE itself. They don't see the benefits of the 
program because they don't understand all of the aspects of 
the program. They see and understand how TRI CARE affects 
their inunediate work area, but they don't fully appreciate the 
overall goals of TRICAR.E (improve access, maintain quality and 
contain costs) . After further reflection, this individual 
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expressed possible concerns that military people have about 
their fitness reports or annual evaluations. 
A lot of civilians work in the same place for a long 
time, so they probably will tend to have more of a 
long term conunitment to (projects) . They can get 
evaluated on the outcome of a project they have been 
working on for a long time. Military people are only 
evaluated on what they do while they're stationed at 
their job. They don't get evaluated on long term 
things because when you finally see results, they're 
gone. I would tend to say that military folks are 
more concerned about what is going on now. They have 
to be more concerned with their regular job because 
that's what the boss sees and that's what goes on 
their fitness report. Their fitness report may say 
"participated in a working group for TRICARE" but that 
probably doesn't count for a whole lot for promotion. 
This individual's point was not that military members of 
groups don't contribute or that they' re not needed. His point 
is that he feels that military people have a difficult time 
dividing their time between what is going on right now and 
activities that may make life easier one, five or ten years 
from now. They are not around for the long term, so their 
view is not typically based on long term either. This is a 
legitimate concern for military members of the working groups. 
In the opinion of this researcher, if there are no rewards 
within the military evaluation system for outstanding 
participation in programs like TRICARE and the FWG's, most 
military individuals have little incentive to take time away 
from those activities that directly influence fitness report 
scores. TRI CARE is not providing these individuals any 
additional rewards or incentives for their participation. 
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Their fitness reports will, most certainly, contain a bullet 
that states that they were "an active, integral member of one 
of TRICARE's working groups," but most individuals won't view 
this as being very critical to promotion potential. If no 
rewards are available within the military system, the TRICARE 
organization must provide some. 
D. Summary. 
All of the issues discussed in this chapter, both good and 
bad, were gleaned from interviews with working group members 
and Project Office personnel. Situations discussed in this 
paper are explained based on group members' perceptions of 
events that have occurred and the effect these events had on 
their respective groups. Stories were told by group members 
during interviews and were based on their best recollection 
and understanding of what happened and why. Differences 
between what was intended by the administration and what was 
perceived by working group members can be used by TRICARE as 
a learning tool for future actions, directives and training 
activities involving working groups. 
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VI. CONCLUSIORS Al1D RBCC»IMDDATIONS 
Chapter V identified "what's working" and "what's not 
working" with TRICARE's Federal Working Groups. Many of the 
issues showed that use of interservice working groups can 
enhance the cooperative effort while others showed that there 
are still some stumbling blocks that still need to be 
overcome. Several conclusions were made as a result of the 
research. 
Conclusion #1. TRICARE' s use of Federal Working Groups is 
an excellent way to foster interservice cooperation among the 
services and the VA. TRICARE' s approach of participative 
management requires a vehicle for workers to provide input 
into the change process. FWG's have effectively been used to 
get workers from similar departments to get together and 
decide what changes need to be made at the working level. If 
participation is the goal, then participation must be allowed 
and encouraged. 
Recommendation: TRICARE should continue to use working 
groups to facilitate interservice communication and aid in the 
change process. Present groups should continue to meet and 
additional groups should be fanned as needs arise. Groups 
should not be fonned simply for the sake of having more 
groups. They should only be fanned if administrators (based 
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on worker input) feel that one is needed to assist facility 
employees in accepting and promoting change. 
Conclusion #2: Current working ~roup size and member mix 
is consistent with enhancing group effectiveness. According 
to O'Reilley and Roberts (1977), the size and mix of the group 
affect group effectiveness. Groups should be small enough to 
facilitate interaction among its members but contain a 
sufficient number of members to ensure all inter~sted parties 
are represented. In the case of TRICARE, working groups are 
small with each hospital and, in some cases, clinics 
represented. Groups should also contain a good mix of 
individuals who are neither so similar to one another that 
they are like peas in a pod nor so different that they have 
trouble working together. Federal Working Group members all 
come from similar departments in each medical facility with 
similar job descriptions. The only dissimilarity that could 
potentially hinder group effectiveness is the inherent 
difference between the military medical function and that of 
the VA. 
Recommendation: TRICARE should continue to ensure that 
a:1 parties within the organization are represented·on working 
groups. Consideration should be given to changing the group 
mix by placing representatives from the contracting and/or 
finance departments on the groups. If these individuals 
became involved in group decision making, they could answer 
questions about contractual and financial limitations that may 
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be involved in implementation of some of their ideas. This 
would eliminate progress delays that require one or more group 
members to go back and consult with their respective 
contract/finance offices. It would also ensure that 
suggestions that would save time and money for departments 
involved in working groups would not result in more work and 
costs in these other departments. 
Conclusion #3. Because of the high degree of external 
integration required by the working groups, group progress has 
been slowed and individual motivation has suffered. The more 
the groups have had to depend on the actions of others 
(survey~ for courier service, contracting issues for MOU's, 
etc.), the more group effectiveness depends on the pace, 
productivity and workload of others. In TRICARE' s case, group 
projects are being put on hold while research or other action 
is being done by someone outside the group. Evidence suggests 
that groups tend to externally integrate with the contracting 
and/or finance departments the most. Group progress tended to 
stop whgn external assistance was required when contracting 
issues arose or providing collective funds was needed. The 
home oxygen issue was delayed by funding issues, the transpor-
tation issue and the MOU' s stopped as soon as contracting 
concerns became an issue. As within most organizations, 
priorities within departments exist and the most urgent items 
are done first and then each successively less urgent item. 
Working group members don't know where their items sit on the 
120 
----------------------------------------- ··-··- - --~ 
priority scale within the organization or within other 
departments. 
Recommendation. If the new Coordinated Care effort is to 
be perceived by workers as an important, command-supported 
endeavor, then actions that result from working group efforts 
must be given high priority within the organization. If not, 
group members will see little significance to their proposals 
and not worth the effort they expend. Groups must be given 
frequent feedback as to the exact status of their action 
items. Simply telling them that "a survey is being conducted" 
is not sufficient. Group members want to know what is being 
done, who's doing it and when they can expect proposals to be 
implemented. Each action item is very important to each group 
member (if not they wouldn't waste time discussing them). If 
action is required outside the group, those actions need to be 
given a sense of priority and feedback must be given to the 
group as to the status of the action. Meetings between group 
leaders and Project Office personnel are an excellent way to 
keep group leaders informed of action status. Group leaders 
can discuss any of their groups' concerns and then relay 
information back to their group at their next meeting. 
Integral relationships must also be developed between 
the working groups and the contracting and finance 
departments. This can be done one of several ways. 
Membership of existing groups could be augmented with members 
from one or both of these departments. This would ensure that 
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contracting and finance concerns and requirements would be 
considered in group recommendations. It would also give 
existing working groups an available resource to refer to 
during meetings. A new working group from contracting and 
finance could also be formed to act on pending TRICARE issues. 
They could meet as necessary and would ensure that what is 
saving time and money in one area is not creating an 
additional administrative, contractual or financial burden in 
another. 
Conclusion #4: Groups were formed with the goal of 
increasing lateral communication and sharing among the medical 
facilities. They were not however given enough initial 
direction or guidance. One of Hackman' s n trip wires" was that 
management assembles a large group of people, tells them what 
is to be accomplished with only general details and lets them 
work out the details. Many of the groups had been meeting for 
over a year before they were officially chartered and group 
members received appointment letters. This may not be a 
problem if group members happen to have the same goals as 
management, but this is not always the case. Some of 
TRICARE's groups were initially successful, but even those 
groups were, at first, unclear as to how much latitude they 
had and how much permission they needed to get before certain 
actions could be taken. Other groups had members who did not 
see much organizational importance in being on a group that 
wasn't officially chartered by the organization. Once 
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appointment letters were distributed and charters prepared, it 
all seemed more worth the effort. 
Recommendation: Appointment letters should be given to 
members prior to their first meeting or at their first 
meeting. Groups should be given official tasking by the 
Commanders' Board as soon as possible. If possible, group 
members should be invited to a Commanders' Board meeting prior 
to their first meeting. The Commanders could express their 
support for the group and advise them as to what types of 
decisions and changes they can make on their own and what 
types will require approval and from whom. Group members need 
to be perfectly clear as to their mission, goals and how much 
latitude they have for making decisions on their own. They 
also need to have a good feeling that the organization 
supports their efforts and sees their participation as 
important and necessary to the success of the organization. 
Conclusion #5: Group members have not received enough 
training or coaching to prepare them to work as effective 
groups. According to Hackman, some organizational factors 
that aid group effectiveness are the availability of 
professional training and expert coaching and process 
assistance. TRICAR.E provides groups the means and the 
opportunity to work together. Group members are not provided 
with training or with a facilitator to provide the group with 
coaching and assistance. If the groups "hits it off" right 
away like some of the FWG' s did, then giving them the 
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opportunity to work together may be a sufficient catalyst to 
promote consolidation, cooperation and changing of old habits. 
If groups have less instant success, they may need assistance 
from a facilitator. Otherwise, groups may flounder and make 
little progress for a long period of time. If groups are left 
alone when having difficulty getting started, they may become 
so frustrated that they give up and become completely 
unproductive. 
Recommendation: When groups first start meeting, a 
trained facilitator should be one of the initial members. The 
facilitator should be trained in leading a group and must also 
be extremely knowledgeable about the overall TRICAR.E 
organization, its mission and goals. The facilitator must 
have a direct line of conununication with decision makers to 
provide timely feedback to groups when questions arise. Group 
members should also be offered training prior to their 
involvement on working groups. One of HacJanan's "trip wires" 
is that group designers assume members already have all of the 
competence 
individuals 
necessary to work well as a team. Average 
in a military organization may not have the 
interpersonal skills or knowledge necessary to work well in a 
multi-service working groups. Although no explicit evidence 
exists that working group members who have not received 
training are less effective than those who have, it is also 
wrong to assume that everyone has all of the necessary 
competencies. It has also been shown in this research that 
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those individuals who have received training viewed it as 
positive motivation and preparation fer their working group 
involvement. 
Conclusion #6. Working group members felt more 
satisfaction when they could see evidence of progres..; and feel 
that they were actually making a difference. Evidence that 
they were making a difference includes seeing increases in 
efficiency and reduced costs within their department (s) . This 
can include less waste, lower costs or quicker turnaround on 
departmental jobs. One example of this was when one group 
member expressed that his boss was happy about his involvement 
in the group because they could see a measurable decrease in 
the number of lab samples that had to be sent out for testing. 
He could see a real cost savings as a result of his working 
group's efforts and so could his boss. Another example is the 
sharing of short dated drugs by the pharmacies. This not only 
equated to less waste, but also $100,000 in cost savings in 
one year's time. When group members can actually see how 
their efforts are making a measurable difference, they are 
more proud of their and their group's efforts. This attitude 
keeps motivation and levels of participation high. 
Recommendation. If groups can readily see how their 
efforts are making a difference throughout the organization, 
little action is required on the part of administrators to 
give groups a feeling of accomplishment. The working groups 
should be recognized for their achievements and encouraged to 
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continue with outstanding performance. If effects of group 
performance are not easily seen by group members, groups must 
still be recognized for their efforts and shown how their 
contributions are making a difference in the organization, no 
matter how small. If group members can see that progress is 
being made toward their end goal and feel that their efforts 
are noticed and appreciated by superiors, they will continue 
to strive for success. If group members feel like their 
efforts are not appreciated or that they are working to no 
end, then their motivation and enthusiasm will dwindle ur.til 
they are no longer a productive member of the group. 
Conclusion #7. Groups that worked on more independent, 
autonomous tasks felt a greater sense of achievement than 
those that required outside assistance. For example, the 
laboratory working group proposed the use of a courier service 
to transport materials from one hospital to another. They, as 
well as other groups, felt that this was a critical element to 
allow sharing between the hospitals. This proposal required 
a survey and a contract. 
to resolve. In the 
These actions were given to others 
meantime, the group independently 
developed their own transportation service to use 
paperwork for the "official" one was being completed. 
while 
This 
autonomous act gave group members a sense of accomplishment. 
While this ad-hoc service is only meant to be temporary, it 
has provided the group with an effective way to help 
themselves. The pharmacy group started sharing short dated 
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drugs with each other as soon as they decided to do so. It 
was easy to implement because they didn't need anyone else's 
help, they just let each other know what was available and 
where it could be found. Each group was doing something for 
themselves to allow sharing to take place without needing 
anyone else's help or approval. When things are easy to do, 
they are more likely to be done. 
Recommendation. Groups should be given as much autonomy 
and decision making authority as possible. Like the lab and 
pharmacy groups, other groups will feel a real sense of 
accomplishment when they can do something to help themselves 
without having to ask permission or get assistance from 
others. Groups should be specifically told from the start 
just how much autonomy they have. They should know what 
actions they can take on their own and what types of decisions 
should be referred to higher authority. The less permission 
that has to be asked, the more likely groups will be to act. 
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